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Negotiation

Maurice E. Schweitzer, University of Pennsylvania

Kori L. Krueger, Morgan State University

Erica Boothby, University of Pennsylvania

Gus Cooney, University of Pennsylvania

Many of our most consequential outcomes derive from negotiations—from the price we pay for homes and cars, to the salaries we earn, to quotidian outcomes such as which household chores we perform, where we go on vacation, and what vegetables our children eat. Though the negotiation process and the nature of negotiated outcomes vary profoundly across contexts, several fundamental features apply to every negotiation.

Negotiation is a communication process between two or more parties with conflicting and convergent interests, including at least one party who is seeking to reach an agreement (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Fisher et al., 2011; Kang et al., 2020; Neale & Bazerman, 1992; see Boothby et al., 2023; Bazerman, et al., 2000; Thompson et al., 2010 for reviews). This chapter provides an overview of negotiation scholarship and focuses on both the stable features of negotiations across contexts and the primary sources of variability.

Every negotiation is characterized by distinctive phases. This review includes the key phases of a negotiation: Setting the stage, communicating, closing, and post-negotiation behavior. Each section highlights key inputs and outcomes of the aforementioned phases and discusses how these phases build upon one another. It is important to note that although humans have negotiated for millennia, empirical academic investigations of negotiation began in the 1960s. Extant negotiation scholarship is reviewed, and promising areas for future study are identified—such as opportunities to study negotiations in the field and with artificial intelligence.

In this review, negotiations are conceptualized as a social interaction. Despite regularities and common features of negotiations, social interactions represent a highly complex and unpredictable human activity. As a result, negotiations reflect this complexity; specifically, both the negotiation process and negotiated outcomes are shaped by different personalities, cultures, idiosyncrasies of verbal and nonverbal expressions, the influence of emotion and trust, the unfolding dynamics of conversation, and the influence of situational factors. This review highlights historic and current psychology and management scholarship that addresses key features of this social interaction. Much of this work documents how variability in features such as emotion can alter the negotiation

process and negotiated outcomes. Reviewing this work offers a broad understanding of negotiation scholarship and highlights opportunities for future scholarship to increase our theoretical understanding of negotiations and the prospect of negotiating more successfully.

PHASES OF NEGOTIATION

This review identifies four phases of negotiation (see Figure 1): Setting the stage, communicating, closing, and post-negotiation behavior. In this review, each phase is considered in turn. Importantly, many negotiations occur over extended periods of time and involve repeated rounds of negotiation. As such, though these phases represent a useful framework for conceptualizing the negotiation process, in practice, negotiations rarely follow a perfectly linear path as they progress from one stage to the next. In addition, the extent to which negotiators spend time in each of these phases may vary considerably across contexts—and across negotiators.

The first phase of negotiation involves setting the stage. In general, negotiators who prepare (e.g., gathering information ahead of time, identifying key questions, and considering others' perspectives) outperform those who do not (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Thompson & Leonardelli, 2004; Thompson et al., 2010; see also Helmold et al., 2022; Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007; Thompson, 2015). However, both the amount and the type of preparation may vary considerably across negotiation contexts and individuals. For example, a crisis negotiator may be unable to prepare before they start negotiating; instead, they may seek to gather information during the communicating phase.


This review introduces an important negotiation classification in relation to preparation: Disputes versus Opportunities. *Dispute Negotiations*, negotiations triggered by a conflict in which one or more parties suffered a loss, are distinct from *Opportunity Negotiations*, negotiations triggered by the opportunity for one or more parties to improve their status quo. Disputes occur within the shadow of power (e.g., going to court), are triggered by a specific event (e.g., a divorce), and are more likely to be characterized by linked outcomes, a shared history, and high emotion. Some Disputes afford parties substantial preparation time (e.g., divorce negotiations), but the time between a loss and the start of a Dispute Negotiation may be relatively short. For example, when a server spills coffee on a patron or when a hotel fails to find a customer's reservation, individuals may begin a negotiation before they spend much time preparing. Opportunity Negotiations, in contrast, typically allow negotiators to plan for the negotiation (e.g., preparing for a conversation to discuss a potential new partnership).

The second negotiation phase is communicating. This phase has received the most scholarly and popular press attention. Here, negotiators perform three important tasks: They engage in non-task communication, exchange information, and exchange offers. By engaging in non-task communication (e.g., "Welcome to my store" or "How was your trip?"), negotiators can build rapport. By exchanging information (e.g., "How long has this property been on the market?"), negotiators can identify opportunities for an agreement and shift leverage. Subsequently, by exchanging offers (e.g., "How about \$3.2 million?"), negotiators can search for a potential agreement.

In the third phase of negotiation, the closing phase, negotiators commit to an agreement (or recognize that they have failed to do so). This may involve a ritual (e.g., a handshake) or a formal document (e.g., a signed contract). In this phase, negotiators make decisions about the specificity and flexibility of their agreement, and they either signal their commitment to the deal or reach an impasse.

Finally, there is the post-negotiation phase. After reaching an agreement, negotiators may continue to interact with one another (e.g., after hiring a new recruit or contracting someone to perform a service). This phase typically involves the creation of measurable value, and the negotiation process can shape this important, but largely overlooked (by scholars), negotiation stage.

Figure 1: Phases of Negotiation



Note: The negotiation process is characterized by several different phases. Often (but not always), negotiators prepare for a negotiation prior to initiating the negotiation process. The decision to initiate a negotiation is a critical step in setting the stage for mutual consent. Communication typically begins with non-task communication (e.g., informal chitchat), proceeds to the exchange of information, and concludes with an exchange of offers. However, these three phases of communication may occur in any order. Negotiations culminate in the acknowledgement of an agreement (e.g., a handshake or a signed contract), followed by post-negotiation behavior (e.g., satisfying the deal or planning a follow-up negotiation).

Though each negotiation phase can profoundly shape outcomes, negotiation research has largely focused on the exchange of offers and the exchange of information phases. As a result, we know surprisingly little about setting the stage, closing, or post-negotiation phases of the negotiation process.

To build their understanding of negotiations, scholars have relied heavily on a roleplay negotiation paradigm. In this paradigm, experimenters recruit participants online, to a behavioral laboratory, or in a classroom setting; subsequently, they provide participants with background information to play a role (e.g., a one-page write-up that prepares them to be the seller of a painting); participants are then paired with a peer or confederate (e.g., someone who will play the role of a buyer of a painting) and complete the communicating phase of negotiation (typically via text or face-to-face); finally, they submit an agreement sheet that allows scholars to assess the economic value of the agreement (see Jang et al., 2018; Boothby et al., 2023).

This experimental paradigm is well-suited to investigate certain questions about the communicating phase of negotiation (e.g., how people respond to different types of questions in a negotiation), but ill-suited to many other questions that remain underexplored, such as how the negotiation process influences post-negotiation behavior, how long-term relationships influence negotiations, and how perceived high stakes influence negotiations. As a result of the heavy reliance on a single paradigm within the negotiation literature, there are substantial gaps in scholars' understanding of negotiations.

The ensuing sections of this chapter describe the key features of the four negotiation phases. Each section concludes with the key questions that remain unanswered within that phase.

Phase 1: Setting The Stage

Relatively few studies have investigated this phase of negotiation. The work that has investigated setting the stage identifies several activities that people should undertake before starting a negotiation. This includes identifying the type of negotiation they are in, deciding to initiate or accept a negotiation, knowing when not to negotiate, gathering information, developing a BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement) and aspiration price, setting goals, perspective-taking about the opposing party, considering who is negotiating, identifying the key issues of the negotiation, considering one's mindset, and planning ahead (e.g., preparing a response to what they might be asked, planning to make concessions).

Recognize And Identify Negotiation Type: Dispute Vs. Opportunity

One key preparation step negotiators should take is to recognize the type of negotiation they are facing (see Table 1 for a typology of negotiations). Much of the existing negotiation scholarship has focused on Opportunity Negotiations. In these negotiations, parties approach each other without a history of conflict or loss, and they seek opportunities to improve their status quo.

In contrast, a vibrant literature in legal scholarship under the broader umbrella of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) has studied negotiations that reflect Dispute Negotiations. In Disputes, one or more parties, having suffered a loss, may approach a counterpart seeking redress. These negotiations, compared to Opportunities, are more likely to be characterized by conflict and intense emotion.

In Opportunity Negotiations, parties explore opportunities to create value. For example, in an Opportunity Negotiation, a seller could gain cash from selling their used couch, whereas a buyer could gain access to inexpensive furniture, or two companies may expect to benefit from a merger. In these cases, negotiators have the opportunity to end up better off than they were before the negotiation took place.

In contrast to Opportunity Negotiations, Dispute Negotiations follow from a disagreement or a failure (Thompson, 2015; Ury et al., 1988; Ury, 1993). For example, following poor service, a customer could seek redress by negotiating a discount. Or, if a neighbor's dog bites a young child, the child's parents could ask the neighbor to repair the situation (e.g., by paying for a doctor's visit). Dispute Negotiations can resolve (or exacerbate) the dispute. Legal scholars conceptualize Dispute Negotiations as occurring "within the shadow" of going to court; that is, if the negotiation process fails, the disputants may go to court, and each party's anticipated costs and benefits of going to trial create the space for an agreement (Coursey & Stanley, 1988; Gross, 2018). When negotiators in a Dispute Negotiation focus on their underlying interests, rather than focusing on their power, they are more likely to conceptualize the negotiation as an Opportunity Negotiation.

Though little negotiation scholarship has highlighted the distinction between Opportunities and Disputes, this distinction is important for several reasons. First, Disputes and Opportunities generally elicit different emotions during a negotiation. For example, whereas disputant negotiators may start a negotiation feeling angry, opportunity negotiators are unlikely to experience frustration before they begin a negotiation (though they may express anger during a negotiation, for strategic reasons; see Section on Expressing Anger). Second, opportunity and dispute negotiators may differ with respect to their BATNAs and the possible actions that are available to them outside

of a negotiation. Opportunity negotiators have the option to seek agreement with other interested parties if the present negotiation fails. In contrast, disputants may focus on an interaction with a particular counterpart (e.g., the neighbor with a dog), and opportunities to negotiate with other parties may be less relevant. Further, disputants are far more likely to consider taking legal action if they cannot come to an agreeable outcome. Finally, negotiators in these two classes are also likely to differ in their goals. Opportunity negotiators generally strive for the best deal for themselves (or for both parties), with a focus on maximizing gains, whereas dispute negotiators are more likely focused on seeking redress and making amends. In some cases, disputants (e.g., divorcing spouses) may even prefer outcomes that are costly to the other side, even if they derive little or no benefit from the concessions themselves.

Table 1: Types of Negotiations

Negotiation Type	Description
Opportunities vs. Disputes	Negotiators can enter a negotiation to search for new opportunities or to resolve a dispute (e.g., following a contract violation).
Distributive vs. Integrative	Distributive negotiations involve a single issue (e.g., price); one party's gain comes at the other's expense. Integrative negotiations involve two or more issues, including at least one issue that is valued differently by the negotiation parties; by trading off concessions across different issues, negotiators can both create and claim value. By introducing additional issues, negotiators can transform distributive negotiations into integrative negotiations (e.g., the seller of a house could add a second issue, such as what furniture to include in the sale, in addition to the distributive issue, the sale price). Many integrative negotiations, however, are characterized by a dominant, distributive issue (e.g., house negotiations may involve multiple issues yet still have a dominant, distributive issue: price). The distributive-integrative distinction is best conceptualized as a continuum.
Dyadic vs. Multiparty	Multiparty negotiations can take many different forms and involve different types of parties. For example, a single buyer and a single seller may negotiate over the sale of a home (dyadic), but when the buyer uses an agent, the negotiation becomes multiparty.
Sincere vs. Insincere	Though many negotiators enter negotiations with the intent of reaching an agreement, some enter negotiations to advance other motives (e.g., to learn information, stall for time, or generate an alternative to use in a separate negotiation). If one or more negotiators are insincere, the negotiation is insincere. Notably, negotiator motives can change during the negotiation process.

Note: Rather than dichotomies, many of these distinctions represent continuums.

Decision To Initiate, Accept, And Persist In A Negotiation

A critical but understudied antecedent to negotiations is the decision to initiate a negotiation. In some cases, the opportunity to negotiate is relatively obvious. For example, some sellers invite buyers to give them their “best offer.” In other cases, the opportunity to negotiate is less obvious, as the dominant paradigm scholars have used to study negotiations overlooks the actual decision to negotiate. For instance, scholars often give participants background materials and instruct them to negotiate; consequently, we know very little about when or how people recognize the opportunity to negotiate (or initiate a negotiation) (see Small et al., 2007 for an exception).

Another underexplored area of research is the decision to accept an invitation to negotiate. When deciding whether to accept such an invitation, each party needs to assess their counterpart’s intentions. *Sincere* negotiators enter a negotiation seeking to reach an agreement (Kang et al., 2020). In contrast, *Insincere* negotiators enter a negotiation seeking to use the negotiation process to achieve an ulterior motive (see Table 1). For example, an insincere negotiator may hope to learn proprietary information, stall for time, or create a positive impression (e.g., show that they are willing to cooperate when they have no intention of actually reaching a negotiated agreement).

Surprisingly, most negotiation scholars have assumed that people enter negotiations with the intent to reach an agreement. In fact, many canonical definitions of negotiation explicitly state this assumption (Fisher et al., 2011; Mislin et al., 2011; Rubin & Brown, 2013). Other work, however—and many lawsuits—reveal that insincere negotiations are pervasive and that the decision to enter a negotiation is an important strategic decision in itself (Kang et al., 2020).

Only a handful of studies have addressed the important questions of when negotiators should initiate a negotiation (Bear et al., 2024), when they should avoid a negotiation (Kang et al., 2020; Hart & Schweitzer, 2020), and when they should exit or persist in an existing negotiation (Kang et al., 2020). In some cases, people should negotiate more; in other situations, they should negotiate less.

The extent to which someone should negotiate more or less will be informed by expectations and opportunities. First, prospective negotiators need to understand the negotiation norms and expectations of their unique situation. These factors will vary across cultures, contexts, and counterparts. For example, most employers expect prospective employees to negotiate—but some do not (Laboria, 2022). Second, prospective negotiators need to consider the costs and benefits of negotiating. When the context is complex, the opportunity to learn about negotiators’ underlying preferences is great, and the stakes are high, people are generally more willing to negotiate because they are more likely to identify opportunities for joint gains. In other cases, entering a negotiation may be costly. For example, when a counterpart does not expect to negotiate and the negotiation involves the delivery of a service (Hart & Schweitzer, 2020), initiating a negotiation may harm the relationship and ultimately harm a counterpart’s post-agreement motivation when they deliver the service. For example, aggressively negotiating with a new babysitter may harm their post-negotiation motivation to do a great job when they are babysitting.

In practice, many people negotiate less than they should. The most common emotion people associate with negotiations is anxiety (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011). Though anxiety can motivate people to prepare for a negotiation, it can also prompt them to avoid or exit a negotiation prematurely (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011). There are several concerns that may trigger anxiety in these situations: When people enter a negotiation, they may place their current agreement at risk

(Galinsky & Schweitzer, 2015), they may harm their relationship with their counterpart (Hart & Schweitzer, 2020), or they may make a costly concession (Maaravi & Levy, 2017). In many cases, however, these concerns are overblown (see Hart et al., 2024). For example, after employers extend offers to prospective employees, some candidates may fear that if they attempt to negotiate, the employer will withdraw the offer. However, research comparing the employer's perspective with that of the prospective employee indicates that job candidates have inflated concerns about the risk of losing an offer by initiating a negotiation (Hart et al., 2024).

Negotiator concerns about harming relational outcomes and making costly concessions are legitimate (Hart & Schweitzer, 2020), but certain strategies can help to mitigate them. Specifically, when it comes to impacting relational outcomes, *how* people negotiate matters more than *whether* they negotiate. For example, by learning about norms, communicating in person, developing rapport, and asking questions, people who choose to negotiate may be able to enhance, rather than harm, their relational outcomes.

In conclusion, future scholars should investigate the decision to initiate a negotiation, accept an invitation to negotiate, and persist in a negotiation. These are important yet substantially understudied questions.

Gathering Information

Prior to initiating a negotiation, each party should gather information about the context, their alternatives, and their counterpart. Gathering information prior to a negotiation is usually critical (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Thompson & Leonardelli, 2004; Thompson et al., 2010; see also Helmold et al., 2022; Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007; Thompson, 2015). Though there is limited scholarship on this topic, research suggests that a lack of preparation is a common negotiator mistake (see Fisher et al., 2011; Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007; Thompson, 2015).

Even with extensive preparation, however, there are times when negotiators can only learn important information from their counterpart during the negotiation process. For example, negotiators may need to ask their counterpart what they are willing to pay or what their future intentions are. In these cases, negotiations are characterized by information dependence—or the need to learn information from their counterpart (Murnighan et al., 1999; Schweitzer & Croson, 1999; Schweitzer & Hsee, 2002). This feature of negotiations makes deception a particular challenge. For example, by lying about the most they are willing to pay, negotiators may be able to attain a better outcome.

To curb the risk of being deceived, negotiators can ask key questions. Conversely, to curb the temptation of engaging in deception, negotiators can prepare by considering their responses to any challenging or complex questions they may be asked prior to a negotiation (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Thompson & Leonardelli, 2004; Thompson et al., 2010; see Helmold et al., 2022; Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007; Galinsky & Schweitzer, 2015). Indeed, well-prepared negotiators are more likely to gather information—by knowing what to ask—and to consider what not to reveal—by preparing responses to difficult questions (e.g., “How much did you make at your last job?”) (Fisher & Ury, 1981; see also Helmold et al., 2022; Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007). In a different but related domain, research has demonstrated that insurance fraud investigators who interviewed claimants gleaned more critical information from non-client sources than they did from client meetings (Warren & Schweitzer, 2018). Though analogous studies have not been conducted in negotiations, and

contextual factors are likely to moderate the results, negotiators may be able to gather critical information as they prepare to negotiate—before and after they meet with their counterpart.

In general, by investing greater time and resources in preparation, negotiators will improve their outcomes. Preparation can boost negotiator confidence prior to a negotiation and strengthen their ability to react to the other party's moves during a negotiation (Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007; Thompson, 2015; Thompson et al., 2010). In most cases, the link between preparation and negotiation performance is very positive. However, scholars have suggested that negotiators can overprepare for a negotiation in some cases (Thompson et al., 2010).

Developing BATNA, Reservation Price, Aspiration Price, And ZOPA

While setting the stage for a negotiation, negotiators should develop their alternatives and understand the price or offer at which they would ultimately walk away (i.e., “reservation price”), as well as the best outcome to which they aspire (i.e., “aspiration price”). They should also gain insight into their counterpart's alternatives and reservation price. Doing so can inform the offers they make and give negotiators greater confidence during the communicating phase.

Best alternative to a negotiated agreement (batna)

Having an attractive option outside the current negotiation is the strongest source of power a negotiating party can have (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Fisher et al., 2011). Research shows that negotiators with a strong (vs. weak) BATNA are more likely to set favorable aspiration prices, make assertive first offers, and ultimately attain better outcomes (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Buelens & Van Poucke, 2004; Kagel et al., 1996; Magee et al., 2007; Pinkley et al., 1994; Lewicki et al., 2011; Wolfe & Valley, 2001; see Fisher & Ury, 1981). This work suggests that one of the most important things negotiators can do as they prepare to negotiate is to develop attractive alternatives. Yet little research has investigated this topic directly.

Several studies have documented a robust relationship between having a strong BATNA and obtaining favorable deal terms. A few studies, however, have deepened—and qualified—our understanding of the relationship between BATNAs and negotiation performance. Specifically, scholars have contrasted the effects of giving participants an explicit, weak BATNA with giving participants no information about a BATNA whatsoever (“No BATNA,” though in practice there is always some alternative to a failed negotiation). This work has found that “No BATNA” may be preferable to a weak BATNA, because a weak BATNA can cause negotiators to set low aspirations and focus their attention on their less desirable alternative (Schaerer et al., 2015). In addition, uncertain BATNAs may have their own benefits (Pinkley et al., 2019). For example, negotiators with uncertain BATNAs may feel optimistic and negotiate just as assertively as those with strong BATNAs. In fact, when negotiators have no BATNA at all, merely *imagining* a strong BATNA can be beneficial (Schaerer et al., 2018); this is because when negotiators imagine having an attractive alternative (Schaerer et al., 2018), or when they have had an attractive alternative option in the past (Brady et al., 2021), they may negotiate better deal terms.

Reservation and aspiration price

Though some prior work has conflated BATNA with reservation price—the price or offer at which a negotiator would actually walk away from a deal—the two are conceptually distinct (Buelens & Van Poucke, 2004). For example, because of pride, a sense of fairness, or inflated expectations, a negotiator may exit a deal even when their counterpart is willing to give them a better outcome than their BATNA. In contrast, a negotiator may be willing to accept a deal that is less favorable than their BATNA if they care about their relational outcomes with the other party (or if they make a mistake). Behavior in the Ultimatum game in which people reject positive sums of money—only to receive \$0—is consistent with this conceptual distinction (Güth et al., 1982; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). That is, a negotiator’s reservation price—also termed “resistance point” or “walkaway value”—may be distinct from their BATNA.


Scholars have argued that negotiators should identify their reservation price before entering a negotiation (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Technically, this is the point at which the party is indifferent to a deal or no deal. For example, a buyer should know the most that they would be willing to pay, whereas the seller should know the least that they would be willing to accept. Adhering to predetermined limits, however, is difficult. Related scholarship studying auction behavior has found that when an auction is underway, people’s emotions tend to influence their behavior, resulting in the negotiator disregarding limits they might have previously set and instead falling prey to “competitive arousal” (Malhotra, 2010). Analogously, negotiators may be influenced by emotion or competitive arousal and either walk away or fail to walk away from a negotiation, ultimately attaining an outcome worse than their BATNA.

Another value negotiators should identify as they prepare for a negotiation is their aspiration price or “target value” (Blount et al., 1995; Blount et al., 1996; White & Neale, 1994). This is the outcome negotiators hope to achieve in their negotiation. Scholars suggest that negotiators should set ambitious yet realistic aspirations (Fisher et al., 2011). Negotiators who set high aspiration prices tend to be more successful in negotiations because a high aspiration price motivates assertive behaviors (e.g., more haggling) and minimizes susceptibility to influence from the other party (see Fisher et al., 2011; Siegel & Fouraker, 1960; Thompson, 2015). In some prior work, scholars have used the initial prices negotiators propose to assess their aspirations (see O’Connor & Carnevale, 1997; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). In most articles, however, scholars have simply asked people to report their aspirations.

Zone of possible agreement

The zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) is the difference between a buyer’s reservation price and a seller’s reservation price (see Figure 2; also known as the “bargaining zone,” Shell, 2006; and “bargaining surplus,” Raiffa, 1982; Farber & Katz, 1979; McKersie et al., 1965). The ZOPA includes the set of possible deals that are acceptable to both parties. To determine the ZOPA in a negotiation, negotiators need to identify two values: their own reservation price and their counterpart’s reservation price. Both values may involve a degree of uncertainty and require effort to calculate; however, it is particularly challenging to identify a counterpart’s reservation price, as people do not usually reveal their reservation price in a negotiation. Negotiators simply hope to obtain a better deal than their bottom line, so people must do their best to estimate the size of the ZOPA based on the information they are able to obtain.

Figure 2: Zone of Possible Agreement



Note: In a distributive negotiation (e.g., a buyer and seller negotiating over the price of a used car), the most a buyer can pay is the Buyer's Reservation Point and the least a seller can accept is the Seller's Reservation Point. The zone between these points represents the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA); any amount within this zone indicates a possible deal. When deciding to make a first offer, buyers are unlikely to know the Seller's Reservation Point. Instead, they may make an offer below the Seller's Reservation Point, which could risk upsetting the seller or result in an impasse; or, they may make an offer above the Seller's Reservation Point, which could be costly in terms of forgoing value.

Setting Goals

Goal setting, or the process of identifying and targeting a specific outcome, can benefit negotiators prior to the negotiation. When a negotiator's goal is to attain a specific price or deal, this goal reflects their aspirations. Goals, however, can be broader than aspirations—and this is especially relevant in negotiations with multiple rounds. For example, a negotiator may set a unique goal for each meeting instead of working toward a consistent aspiration price in every interaction. In an initial meeting, for instance, a negotiator may decide to build a long-term relationship, learn about their counterpart's underlying interests, or try to convince their counterpart that they will definitely go to court. This same negotiator may adopt a new goal in each subsequent meeting.

Most studies investigating goals in the context of a negotiation have conceptualized goals as aspirations. This work has found that specific, challenging goals tend to improve negotiated outcomes (Lewicki et al., 2011; Stevens et al., 1993). Like studies that have identified a close link between goal setting and motivation across many domains, negotiation scholars have found that those who set specific and challenging goals tend to achieve better negotiation outcomes (Huber & Neale, 1987; Neale & Bazerman, 1985; Northcraft et al., 1994; see Zetik & Stuhlmacher, 2002).

There are many open questions about the relationship between goal setting and negotiation. For example, how should negotiators set goals? And how might they reset goals as they learn new information during a negotiation? Scholarship has distinguished among different types of goals and different types of negotiation contexts. Some of this work has distinguished between "Distributive Negotiations" (i.e., negotiations characterized by a single issue, such as price) and "Integrative Negotiations" (i.e., negotiations characterized by multiple issues in which tradeoffs are possible) (Pruitt, 1981) (see Table 1). In distributive negotiations, one party's gain comes at the other party's expense; in these cases, assertive goals can help negotiators claim a larger share of the so-called pie. Conversely, in integrative negotiations, parties can achieve mutually beneficial outcomes by trading

off concessions across different issues or finding common interests (Neale & Bazerman, 1992; Fisher et al., 1981; Rubin & Pruitt, 1994; Thompson et al., 2010); depending on the context, goal setting may or may not promote integrative outcomes.

In related goal setting scholarship, researchers have found that performance goals, or goals that focus on achievement or a specific outcome (Locke & Latham, 1990), boost performance in distributive negotiations (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001), though they can also lead to greater impasse rates and less integrative outcomes (Tasa et al., 2013). In contrast, learning goals, or goals that focus on learning effective strategies by increasing one's knowledge (Locke & Latham, 1990), may be beneficial in integrative negotiations or multi-issue negotiations (Seijts & Latham, 2005). For example, learning goals can help a negotiator gain knowledge about the other party's interests and allow for more creative solutions (Tasa et al., 2013). Learning goals are also beneficial for interdependent tasks, or those in which one's reputation could be impacted (Tinsley et al., 2002).

Though goal setting is a foundational construct in motivation, we know relatively little about the goal setting process in negotiations (Locke & Latham, 2002; Schweitzer et al., 2004); the majority of scholarship investigating goal setting in negotiations has been completed in the lab, and as a result, we know very little about how people set goals in relation to their identities, values, past experiences, and broader objectives (Zetik & Stuhlmacher, 2002).

Perspective-Taking Of The Opposing Party

Perspective-taking is particularly important in negotiations. By understanding their counterpart's interests and reservation values, negotiators can attain far better outcomes for themselves (Fisher et al., 2011; Thompson, 1990; Thompson & Hastie, 1990). However, understanding one's own values is difficult, and developing accurate beliefs about others' values and interests is especially challenging (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; Jervis, 1976; Ross & Ward, 1995; Thompson & Hrebec, 1996).

If negotiators are uncertain about their counterpart, or if they hold inaccurate beliefs about their counterpart, they may misattribute the other party's motives (Morris et al., 1999). For example, an overly suspicious negotiator may assume their counterpart is asking them questions to identify information that they can use to exploit them. Ultimately, negotiators who hold mistaken beliefs about their counterpart reach less efficient outcomes (Thompson & Hrebec, 1996) or impasses (Thompson, 1990). Thus, during the preparation phase, negotiators should spend time gathering information and accurately determining the opposing party's interests, priorities, and BATNA (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001).

To do this optimally, negotiators should take the opposing party's perspective. This is known as perspective-taking, and it indicates a person's capacity to consider the world from another's point of view and anticipate that party's reaction to events (Davis, 1983; Moore, 2005). In a negotiation context, perspective-taking can help negotiators identify the underlying interests of opposing parties. This can be advantageous in integrative negotiations by helping negotiators identify creative solutions that yield greater individual and joint gains (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Galinsky et al., 2008; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Neale & Bazerman, 1992; Lax & Sebenius, 1986). Perspective-taking is also advantageous in distributive negotiations, as it can help negotiators avoid the power effect of an opponent's first offer (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001) and instead elicit concessions (Neale & Bazerman, 1983). In this way, perspective-taking is critical in negotiations, yet we know relatively little about the antecedents and individual traits that can help negotiators consider others' perspectives.

Who Is Negotiating

When it comes to setting the stage for a negotiation, it is important to consider one's counterpart. This section highlights how people's power and status, group differences, and the relationship between counterparts can affect negotiations. It also examines negotiations among more than two parties—i.e., group and multiparty negotiations.

Power and status

Negotiations are heavily influenced by how much power individual negotiators have in the negotiation. Power is typically defined as the amount of control individuals have over valuable resources; in negotiations, the term is defined as the extent to which a negotiator can influence the final outcome (Galinsky et al., 2017). Implicit in this definition is the idea that power is relative. In negotiations, however, power to reach or block an outcome may be shared across multiple parties.

There are many *sources of power* in a negotiation (French & Raven, 1959; see Boothby et al., 2023; Galinsky et al., 2017; Schaerer et al., 2020). The most studied source of power is having a strong BATNA (Fisher & Ury, 1981; see Galinsky et al., 2017; Schaerer et al., 2020). Scholars have typically studied the effects of having a strong BATNA by giving participants in an experiment a stronger or weaker BATNA. These studies have found that a strong BATNA confers power to a negotiator, making them less dependent on the other party to achieve their goals (Galinsky et al., 2017; Pinkley et al., 2019; Pinkley et al., 1994; Schaerer et al., 2016; Schaerer et al., 2015). Prior work finds that negotiators with a strong BATNA set higher goals (Pinkley, 1995), behave more aggressively (Galinsky et al., 2003; Gruenfeld et al., 2008), and achieve better outcomes (Komorita & Leung, 1985; Pinkley et al., 1994). Important open questions remain, however, with respect to how negotiators might recognize the importance of developing a stronger BATNA—and then develop a stronger BATNA as they prepare for a negotiation.

That said, in most negotiations, there are other sources of power beyond having a strong BATNA. First, power can come from the amount of information a negotiator holds (see Galinsky et al., 2017; Schaerer et al., 2020). Knowledge about each party's underlying interests in a negotiation can help negotiators claim value (Thompson & Hastie, 1990), and knowledge of one's counterparts can determine the most effective strategies to use in the negotiation (Brett, 2000; Pinkley, 1995; Wong, 2014).

Second, power can derive from status (see Galinsky et al., 2017; Schaerer et al., 2020). Status is the extent to which someone is respected by another party (Brett & Thompson, 2016; Magee & Galinsky, 2008), and it affords power for several reasons. First, high-status negotiators are viewed as more competent than low-status negotiators (Rivera, 2012; 2015); second, they are also considered more trustworthy (and deferred to more often) (Berger et al., 1972; Sauder et al., 2012), receive more generous offers and greater compensation (Ball & Eckel, 1996; Belliveau et al., 1996), and create more value (Blader & Chen, 2012).

Third, power can come from social capital (see Galinsky et al., 2017; Schaerer et al., 2020). Social capital—or establishing and maintaining a strong network and connections (Kilduff & Brass, 2010)—allows negotiators to secure better opportunities and negotiate better deals, affording greater access to negotiation partners and coalitions (Kim & Fragale, 2005; Kravitz & Iwanisek, 1984). According to

Schaerer and colleagues (2020), power can also come from a person's expertise and their ability to coerce others into compliance.

Turning to *consequences of power*, several scholars have demonstrated that negotiators with more power attain more favorable outcomes (Gunia et al., 2013; Schaerer et al., 2015). Not only do negotiators with greater power have more leverage in a negotiation, but these negotiators also derive psychic benefits—allowing negotiators to feel powerful—that help them attain better outcomes (Keltner et al., 2003; Galinsky et al., 2015; Galinsky et al., 2017). For example, high-power negotiators feel more confident than those with less power (Fast et al., 2012; See et al., 2011; Tost et al., 2012); they are also considered more optimistic (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). Compared to negotiators with less power, high-power negotiators are more persuasive (Kilduff & Galinsky, 2013; Lammers et al., 2013; Schmid & Schmid Mast, 2013), better at seeing the bigger picture (Kifer et al., 2013; Kraus et al., 2011; Magee et al., 2008; Smith & Trope, 2006), and less likely to be influenced by their counterpart (Galinsky et al., 2008). When negotiators have greater power, they feel less distressed toward others' suffering (van Kleef et al., 2008), they experience less stress themselves (Schmid & Schmid Mast, 2013), and they are less likely to be swayed by the other party's tactics (Schmid & Schmid Mast, 2013).

However, the consequences of power may depend on the source of power (see Galinsky et al., 2017; Schaerer et al., 2020). Though favorable alternatives are a key source of power in negotiations (Fisher & Ury, 1981; see Galinsky et al., 2017), these alternatives can also anchor the negotiator. For example, negotiators with a weak BATNA may become anchored by their BATNA, and ultimately claim less value than those with no BATNA at all (Schaerer et al., 2015). Similarly, negotiators with multiple alternatives often become anchored by the mid-point of their alternatives (rather than the best alternative) and end up claiming less value than those with one strong alternative (Schaerer et al., 2016).

Scholarship has also considered relative levels of power within dyads (see Schaerer et al., 2020). Some studies have found that dyads with equal-power negotiators create greater value than those with unequal-power negotiators (Giebels et al., 2000; Mannix & Neale, 1993). Other studies, however, have found that relative power within a dyad does not influence the efficiency of outcomes (Lawler & Yoon, 1993; Wiltermuth et al., 2018) and that unequal power within a dyad helps negotiators create value (Greer & van Kleef, 2010). Possibly, factors beyond the distribution of power can moderate how efficiently negotiators structure agreements (see Schaerer et al., 2020).

High-power negotiators can *act powerful* by enacting behaviors that help them attain more favorable outcomes. For example, high-power negotiators are not only more likely to make a first offer than their low-power counterparts (Blader & Chen, 2012; Magee et al., 2007), but they are also more likely to make an ambitious first offer (Magee et al., 2007; Schaerer et al., 2020). In addition, high-power negotiators are more likely to ask for more (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Magee et al., 2007), less likely to make concessions, and more likely to retaliate when the other party expresses anger (van Kleef & Côté, 2007; van Kleef et al., 2006).

Negotiation scholarship has identified specific behaviors that may afford negotiators power or status. Common behaviors include expressing dominance (Kim et al., 2006; Mast & Hall, 2003); dominance is known to project power (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Burgoon & Dunbar, 2006; Dunbar, 2004; Carnevale et al., 1981), eliciting concessions from the other party (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Camras, 1984; Komorita & Brenner, 1968; Pruitt, 1981; Rosa & Mazur, 1979; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006), and enabling negotiators to claim greater value (Camras, 1984; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Sinaceur et al., 2011). For example, negotiators can exhibit dominance by staring at their

counterpart (Lewis & Fry, 1977), taking an aggressive tone (Komorita & Brenner, 1968), or expressing anger (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). Negotiators may also use subtle displays of dominance such as adopting a powerful stance, taking up extensive space with their posture (Huang et al., 2011; Tiedens & Fragale, 2003), or interrupting the other party (Mast & Hall, 2003).

Dominance behaviors may benefit negotiators differently depending on the level of power that they hold in the negotiation. Specifically, research shows that lower-power negotiators who were instructed to behave dominantly (vs. those who were not) were better able to claim value because displays of dominance made them feel more powerful, leading to more assertive behavior (Wiltermuth et al., 2018). Additionally, examining dominance at the dyadic level suggests that there are coordination benefits to such displays: Dyads in which the more powerful negotiator acted dominantly and the other did not created more value than dyads in which neither, both, or only the lower-power negotiator used dominance displays (Wiltermuth et al., 2018). This research finds that if one party's dominant behavior elicits submissiveness in the other party, mutually beneficial outcomes may ensue by prompting a greater information exchange that leads to increased value creation (Wiltermuth et al., 2015; Wiltermuth et al., 2018).

Dominance behaviors, particularly anger expressions, may benefit negotiators differently depending on the person and the expression itself. Though anger expressions convey dominance (Belkin et al., 2013) and signal power (Frijda, 1986; Tiedens, 2001) and status (Brescoll & Uhlmann, 2008; Tiedens, 2001), research shows that only men were afforded status when expressing anger (Brescoll & Uhlmann, 2008). Additionally, low-intensity anger expressions led to a boost in status over sadness or neutral expressions, yet high-intensity anger expressions did not—because they yield lower perceptions of competence and warmth (Gaertig et al., 2019).

Negotiators may engage in other behaviors to show or attain power and status. Powerful negotiators may be successful in negotiations because they can coerce their counterpart into compliance by punishing (De Dreu, 1995) or threatening (Sinaceur et al., 2011; Wiltermuth et al., 2018; Wiltermuth et al., 2015) them. Alternatively, some research also suggests that “warmth” behaviors (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; Flynn et al., 2006), or showing concern for the welfare of others (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Willer, 2009), can afford higher status. However, open questions remain with respect to the contextual and individual difference moderators that enable people to attain and project power.

Relationships

Negotiation occurs among strangers, acquaintances, work colleagues, and close relational friends or partners. In many cases, negotiators are interdependent (Cross & Madson, 1997; Kashima et al., 1995). They may feel more or less connected to the other party depending on their shared history, individual or group differences, and culture (Gelfand et al., 2006). For example, women typically feel more connected to their negotiation partner than men (Amanatullah et al., 2008; Bowles et al., 2007).

Negotiating with a familiar counterpart versus a stranger or acquaintance does not ensure a better outcome (Greenhalgh & Chapman, 1998; Thompson & DeHarpport, 1998; see McGinn, 2006). In fact, several studies show that negotiating with a close other, or having strong relational goals in a negotiation, can lead to a greater willingness to compromise—causing negotiators to make more generous offers, claim less value, and become more willing to accept a suboptimal agreement (Amanatullah et al., 2008; Curhan et al., 2008; Fry et al., 1983; Halpern, 1994; 1997; Howard et al.,

2007; Jones & Rachlin, 2006; Patton & Balakrishnan, 2010; Ten Velden et al., 2009). Scholars have cited “relational accommodation,” or a willingness to sacrifice economic outcomes to bolster or maintain relational outcomes (Curhan et al., 2008). That is, negotiators may worry about harming their relationship with the other party if they act aggressively or use distributive tactics (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Babcock et al., 2006; Bowles et al., 2007; Bear & Segel-Karpas, 2015; Curhan et al., 2008; Patton & Balakrishnan, 2010). It is possible, however, that prior scholarship—which has largely ignored post-negotiation behavior and long-term relationships—has mischaracterized relational accommodation as an error. In line with scholarship documenting the economic value of post-negotiation behavior (see Hart & Schweitzer, 2022), relational accommodation may not only promote relational outcomes, but also boost long-term economic outcomes.

The expectations people develop when they negotiate with familiar counterparts represent a related challenge. When negotiating with a familiar counterpart, people may expect their partner to be friendly and cooperative (Patton & Balakrishnan, 2010; Ramirez-Fernandez et al., 2018), or to make more generous offers (Ramirez-Fernandez et al., 2018). If these expectations go unmet, negotiators are more likely to negatively evaluate their counterparts and resist reaching an agreement. Perspective-taking, however, can mitigate this problem, as long as negotiators realize they have inflated expectations of their relational partners (Ramirez-Fernandez et al., 2018).

Group differences

Group differences such as gender, race, and culture can influence negotiation behavior and outcomes. In some cases, individuals may act differently based on group differences. For example, women may be less likely to initiate a negotiation than men (Kugler et al., 2018). In other cases, negotiators are treated differently based on group differences; for example, buyers who are Black may be offered higher sales prices than buyers who are White (Ayres & Siegelman, 1995). In addition, people may be evaluated differently, even when they behave similarly. For example, women who act assertively may be perceived less favorably than assertive men (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013). Ultimately, the manner in which people are treated and evaluated can influence how they behave. This section focuses on how group differences influence negotiations.

Substantial literature has investigated *gender* differences in negotiation (see Bowles et al., 2022; Toosi et al., 2020). Some of the earliest work investigating gender differences explored the idea that women behave more cooperatively than men (Rubin & Brown, 2013), but scholars have found conflicting evidence in support of this thesis (see Kray & Thompson, 2004; Rubin & Brown, 2013; Walters et al., 1998). It is quite possible that gender differences themselves may have changed over the past 50 years; replications of studies conducted several decades ago may yield different results because the phenomena have changed. Though negotiation scholarship has focused more on the challenges women face in negotiations, each of the two dominant genders experience unique challenges in negotiation (Mazei et al., 2022).

The *decision to initiate a negotiation* is particularly important, and several scholars have identified a consistent pattern: Women are less likely to initiate a negotiation than men (Kugler et al., 2018; Small et al., 2007). In a classic study, an experimenter describes a pay range for performance, compliments the participant for performing well, and then offers the participant the lowest end of the pay range. In these studies, women are less likely to ask for more money than men (Small et al., 2007). More broadly, women are less likely to initiate negotiations, even when negotiations are consequential, as is the case in job negotiations (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Amanatullah & Tinsley,

2013; Artz et al., 2018). When women do negotiate, they may attain worse outcomes than men (Bowles et al., 2005; see Mazei et al., 2015).

However, many gender effects vary by context. Often, negotiation studies involve masculine-stereotyped domains (Small et al., 2007; Kugler et al., 2018; see Bowles et al., 2022). For example, although women are less likely to negotiate their salaries than men (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Bowles et al., 2007; Kugler et al., 2018; Leibbrandt & List, 2015; Mazei et al., 2015), women are just as likely to negotiate—and to do so assertively—when the negotiation involves workload or family-friendly workplace practices (Bear, 2011; Berdahl & Moon, 2013; Bowles et al., 2019; Rousseau et al., 2006; Rudman & Mescher, 2013).

Gendered norms and expectations may influence how men and women negotiate. In the United States, women are stereotypically more collectivistic, agreeable, and cooperative than men, who are stereotypically more individualistic, assertive, and competitive (Cuddy et al., 2015; Kray et al., 2001). People may internalize gender stereotypes and behave in accordance with their gender expectations (Eagly & Wood, 2012; Kray et al., 2001; Kray et al., 2002; Eagly & Wood, 2012). In negotiations, gendered stereotypes may result in beliefs that women do not negotiate assertively or at all (Bowles et al., 2007; Kray et al., 2001; Kray et al., 2002). Exposure to such stereotypes may not only hinder women's intentions to negotiate, but also adversely affect women who do negotiate. For example, people report that they are more willing to work with men who negotiate than with women who negotiate (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013; Bowles et al., 2007; Duguid & Thomas-Hunt, 2015); they also ascribe more negative attributions to women who negotiate (e.g., women who negotiate are more immodest or materialistic) (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013; Al Dabbagh et al., 2016; Artz et al., 2018).

Gender differences in negotiations are most pronounced when gender stereotypes are salient (Bowles et al., 2004; Kugler et al., 2018; Kray & Gelfand, 2009; Mazei et al., 2015; see Bowles et al., 2022). Contextual features, including the work setting and culture can cue gender stereotypes (Kolb & McGinn, 2009; Tost, 2015; Galinsky et al., 2018; see Bowles et al., 2022), which can exacerbate gender differences (see Kugler et al., 2018; Mazei et al., 2015). For example, in male-stereotyped settings (e.g., selling motorcycle parts) men are more likely to initiate a negotiation and to negotiate better outcomes than women (Galinsky et al., 2003; Kolb & McGinn, 2009; Roth, 2009; Small et al., 2007; Sturm, 2009; Kugler et al., 2018; Bear & Babcock, 2012; Mazei et al., 2015). Recent work has found that gender effects can be diminished when negotiators learn about their counterparts and perceive them as individuals, rather than as representations of a social group (see Bowles et al., 2022).

To address gender differences and *increase the likelihood that women will initiate negotiations*, some scholars have proposed that women reframe the negotiation process. Specifically, women may be more likely to initiate a negotiation when they view the context as an opportunity to ask for something, rather than an opportunity to negotiate (Small et al., 2007). Opportunities to make a request are viewed as more polite than opportunities for negotiation, and thus, they are more congruent with stereotypical gender roles.

Advocacy also affects how women perform in negotiations. Women are much less likely than men to advocate for themselves in negotiations, in part because they face a higher risk when they do so (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bowles et al., 2022). However, when women advocate for others in a negotiation, they are perceived as more assertive and more effective (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bowles et al., 2022; Mazei et al., 2015). This is consistent with gender stereotypes that perceive

women as more communal than men, and with those that view women more positively when they advocate for others versus themselves (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013).

One strategy for improving women's success in negotiations is to directly address the inequality in outcomes. By informing women that men reach more successful outcomes in negotiation before the negotiation process begins, women can act more assertively and work more strategically to attain better outcomes (Kray et al., 2001). Similarly, by decreasing ambiguity around the scope and standard for agreement in a negotiation, both parties can reduce any gender differences in negotiated outcomes (Bowles et al., 2005; see Bowles et al., 2022). Interestingly, priming women with power can further mitigate gender differences (Hong & van der Wijst, 2013; Galinsky et al., 2013; Small et al., 2007), as some scholars have conceptualized gender differences as power differences (Galinsky & Schweitzer, 2015).

A few studies have documented *gender differences in negotiation behavior*. Specifically, prior research has found that women are more likely to change their strategy based on who the other party is—for example, by compromising more when negotiating with other women (Bowles & Flynn, 2010; Curhan et al., 2008; Miles & LaSalle, 2009), by exhibiting more conflict-avoidant behaviors, and by acting more ethically than men (Kennedy et al., 2017; Kray & Haselhuhn, 2012; Pierce & Thompson, 2018). Simultaneously, women are more likely to be deceptive when advocating for others versus themselves (thus, engaging in the same level of deception as men) (Kouchaki & Kray, 2018).

Research also suggests that both men and women adjust their negotiation strategies depending on the gender of the other party. When negotiating with women, both men and women tend to be more deceptive—possibly because women are perceived as less competent and more agreeable than men (Kray et al., 2014). Conversely, when negotiating with men, people, in general, are less trusting of men's initial offers (Maoz, 2009); they are also more likely to doubt men who claim that they cannot make concessions (Bowles & Flynn, 2010)—perhaps because men are perceived as hypercompetitive.

Scholars have also considered *the influence of being a man in negotiations* (Kennedy & Kray, 2015; Mazei et al., 2021; Mazei et al., 2022). Like women, men also face unique pressures and barriers that affect their behavior in negotiations. A key driver of men's behavior in negotiations is the pressure to demonstrate their ability, alongside a belief that negotiation is a “man's job” (Haselhuhn et al., 2014; Kray et al., 2001; Lee et al., 2017; Mazei et al., 2021). Based on work on precarious manhood—the idea that men need to show their masculinity to keep their status as a “real man” (Vandello & Bosson, 2013; Vandello et al., 2008)—underperformance in a negotiation may cause men to lose face or status (Kennedy & Kray, 2015; Kray & Haselhuhn, 2012; Lee et al., 2017; see Mazei et al., 2021). As a result, men may become more competitive (Netchaeva et al., 2015) or more likely to behave unethically in negotiations (Haselhuhn et al., 2014; Kray et al., 2001; Lee et al., 2017).

In comparison to research on gender, less is known about how *race and ethnicity* influence the negotiation process. Existing research on race and ethnicity in negotiation outcomes has emphasized how stereotypes affect people's behavior toward negotiators of different races and ethnicities. This work has found that Black people attain worse outcomes in negotiations compared to White people (Ayres, 1991; Ayres & Siegelman, 1995). This is likely due to racial stereotypes that negatively characterize Black people (e.g., as incompetent; Devine, 1989; Devine & Elliot, 1995; Plous & Williams, 1995). More recent work has directly examined this and found that race-based expectations (e.g., “that Black people should not ask for more”; McConahay, 1983; Sidanius et al., 2000) lead to worse outcomes for Black negotiators (Hernandez et al., 2019). Similar to women, Black

people are expected to negotiate less, and when this expectation is violated, outcomes worsen for those negotiators.

Race-based expectations can also influence reactions to emotional expressions (Adam & Shirako, 2010; Salerno et al., 2019). For example, expressing anger, which can elicit concessions during a negotiation (Sinaceur et al., 2011), is less beneficial for Black (vs. White) negotiators—and less beneficial for women than for men—because the display of emotion is used to discredit Black and women negotiators (Salerno et al., 2019). However, other research has found that East Asian negotiators who express anger elicit greater cooperation than non-East-Asian negotiators who do the same; this may be the result of the violation of stereotypic expectations (Adam & Shirako, 2010). That is, because the anger expression is unexpected, it serves as a strong signaling value. Thus, people's expectations and stereotypes around race and ethnicity may affect how they perceive others and negotiate.

Culture also plays a significant role in shaping both negotiation behavior and negotiated outcomes. The cultural context has a strong influence on how people interpret behavior as it defines what is appropriate during a negotiation (Brett et al., 2014; Brett, 2007; Gibson, 1999; Hall, 1976). Culture affects what people attend to (Ambady et al., 1996; Gelfand et al., 2001; Gunia et al., 2016), what they expect (Brett et al., 2014), and how they believe they should behave (Aslani et al., 2013; Aslani et al., 2016; Brett et al., 2014). A few leading scholars have developed useful frameworks for understanding the influence of culture on negotiation.

Much of the research on culture has compared negotiation behavior and outcomes of people from two or more nations or cultural groups, with an emphasis on differences between *East and West cultures* (Gunia et al., 2016). For example, researchers have theorized that Eastern and Middle Eastern cultures place a greater focus on relational outcomes (Aslani et al., 2013; Gelfand et al., 2012), use more persuasion and offer-making strategies (vs. information exchange strategies) (Gunia et al., 2011; Liu & Wilson, 2011; Lügger et al., 2015), and prefer less direct confrontation (Adam et al., 2010; Brett et al., 2014; Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003; Semnani-Azad & Adair, 2013).

Emerging research has moved beyond the East-versus-West paradigm. For example, Lu (2023) suggests that findings showing that Asian people have higher starting salaries than White people conflates three groups of Asians: East Asians, Southeast Asians, and South Asians. When we disentangle these different Asian populations, we find that South Asians earn the highest salaries of all ethnicities, but that East Asians and Southeast Asians earn some of the lowest.

Another important framework for understanding negotiation behavior and outcomes categorizes cultures into *dignity, face, and honor cultures*. These categories can account for different conflict styles and explain how people construe behavior and approach reconciliation (Aslani et al., 2013). Specifically, in dignity cultures (e.g., most Western European and North American cultures), a person's self-worth is intrinsic, and the distribution of power is egalitarian; in these cultures, people negotiate directly and rationally. In face cultures (e.g., many East and Southeast Asian cultures), a person's self-worth is derived from their social interactions, and power is derived from a stable hierarchy; in these cultures, people negotiate less directly, value humility, and seek to fulfill their collective duty. In honor cultures (e.g., many Middle Eastern and Latin American cultures), a person's self-worth is a function of how they are viewed by society, and power is hierarchical, dynamic, and often contested; in these cultures, people use both direct and indirect strategies to negotiate and are highly emotionally expressive. Research suggests that negotiators from honor and face cultures use more competitive strategies during a negotiation than those from dignity cultures (Aslani et al., 2016). Negotiators from honor and face cultures may also claim more value than their

dignity culture counterparts, leading to greater distributive tactics such as feigned anger, exaggeration, and pressure (Leung & Cohen, 2011; Aslani et al., 2016, Yao et al., 2017). In contrast, negotiators from dignity cultures tend to engage in more integrative strategies by sharing information and focusing on joint gains.

Though researchers have made important strides in developing our understanding of the effects of gender, race, and culture in negotiations, there is a *need for new research*. First, the influence of gender, race, and culture are likely to be important, but they may shift over time. For example, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors toward gender differences documented in the 20th century may not reflect attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors today. Moreover, the existing literature has focused exclusively on men and women—leaving many open questions about negotiations for people with non-binary gender identities (or those beyond the man/woman dichotomy).

Second, future work should investigate the intersection of these variables (Shan et al., 2019), as stereotypes and gender norms may differ across races and cultures (Ghavami & Peplau, 2013; Rosette et al., 2016; Phelan & Rudman, 2010). Similarly, stereotypes may differ across cultures for men and women. For example, White men may be viewed as assertive, whereas Asian men may be viewed as shy (Ghavami & Peplau, 2013). Similarly, Black women may be stereotyped differently than White women (Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008; Rosette et al., 2016; Sturm, 2009). In addition, status tends to vary across gender, race, and culture (Berger et al., 2018; Lin et al., 2005)—often in ways that influence how people are treated in negotiations. For example, prior work has found that White men are offered lower prices when buying a car than women or Black people (Ayres & Siegelman, 1995), and that Black jobseekers are offered lower starting salaries than White jobseekers (Hernandez et al., 2019). These findings suggest that additional work is needed to explore intersections between race and gender (Bowles et al., 2022; Clair et al., 2019; Toosi et al., 2020). In addition, future work should examine other group differences, such as those based on sexual identity (Hudson & Ghani, 2021).

Group and multiparty negotiations

Not all negotiations occur between two parties; rather, negotiations commonly take place within larger groups or between teams. *Team negotiations* are common and far more complex than one-on-one negotiations (Brodt & Thompson, 2001; Thompson et al., 1996; Polzer et al., 1995; see Boothby et al., 2023; Cohen & Thompson, 2011). A few studies have investigated team negotiations and found that teams generally outperform individuals by claiming more value and achieving greater joint gains than individual negotiators (Brodt & Thompson, 2001; Cohen et al., 2014; Huffmeier et al., 2019; Morgan & Tindale, 2002; Polzer, 1996; Thompson et al., 1996; see Cohen & Thompson, 2011 for a review). In contrast to individual negotiators, teams process information more efficiently and solve problems more effectively (De Dreu, 2010). For example, compared to individual negotiators, negotiating teams are more likely to identify compatible issues and attain mutually beneficial tradeoffs (Huffmeier et al., 2019; Morgan & Tindale, 2002; Polzer, 1996; Thompson et al., 1996).

There are several possible reasons why teams outperform individuals. First, in contrast to solo negotiators, some members of a negotiation team are less likely to focus their attention on what they need to say next, and instead focus their attention on their counterparts. Second, teams tend to exchange more information than individuals (Cohen et al., 2014; Thompson et al., 1996), and are more likely to identify optimal outcomes (Cohen et al., 2014). Teams are also more likely to have a skilled negotiator, such as someone who asks effective questions and gleans valuable information from their counterpart (Huffmeier et al., 2019).

Scholars have also identified some disadvantages to team negotiation. For example, some research shows that teams generate worse relational outcomes than individual negotiators (Huffmeier et al., 2019); this may reflect the fact that teams are more competitive (Naquin & Kurtzberg, 2009; Polzer, 1996). Ultimately, compared to individuals, negotiating parties are less trusting of teams (Swaab et al., 2021). Swaab et al. (2021) offers a prescription: When negotiating as a team, members should engage in pre-negotiation conversations, identify superordinate goals, and be mindful of the need to develop trust.

Multiparty negotiations involve three or more parties (see Crump & Glendon, 2003). With multiple parties, negotiators need to gather and process information more efficiently, and potentially be more judicious in how they reveal information. Compared to dyadic negotiations, multiparty negotiations are significantly more complex (see Table 1).

Individuals in multiparty negotiations may also feel they have less control over outcomes than those in dyadic negotiations (Kerr, 1989; Kramer, 1991); as a result, they may expect less reciprocity. For example, a negotiator could make a deal with one party and leave another party (or several parties) out of an agreement. The mere prospect of being left out of a deal may drive negotiator behavior, such as a desire to form coalitions (Moreland, 2010).

In this way, multiparty negotiations are more challenging—and more likely to end in an impasse—than dyadic negotiations (Traavik, 2011). One interesting feature of multiparty negotiations is that negotiators are likely to find allies, at least among some counterparts, with regard to certain issues (Raiffa, 1982). Reflecting the complexity of multiparty negotiation, research shows that multiparty negotiators have weaker fixed-pie perceptions and engage in more integrative strategies than dyadic negotiators (Kern et al., 2020).

Every human group, across cultures and throughout history, is characterized by hierarchy (Galinsky & Schweitzer, 2015). This means that some members of a group have greater power than others. The study of hierarchy in negotiations, especially hierarchy within a negotiation team, represents a significant opportunity for future scholarship. Doyle and colleagues (2023) suggest that hierarchical structures within a team might be harmful to reaching efficient agreements, as hierarchy reduces information elaboration and increases competitive behaviors. Hierarchy, however, may also promote team functioning—by enabling team members to identify specific roles and responsibilities. Possibly, hierarchical negotiating teams will outperform less hierarchical negotiating teams.

Who is negotiating: conclusion

Negotiations are shaped by individuals and their power dynamics, as well as their relationships and social identities. People often negotiate as part of a group or a team, rather than a dyad. Knowing the other negotiating party (or parties) is an important part of setting the stage for a negotiation. A growing literature has expanded our understanding of the negotiation process and negotiated outcomes as they vary across these contexts, but there is still a great deal to explore in the future.

Identifying Issues

Scholars have classified types of issues in a negotiation. *Distributive* issues fall along a single dimension (e.g., price, salary) and involve one party's gain coming at the other's expense (Pruitt,

1981). For example, if a buyer agrees to pay a high price, it is beneficial for the seller but harmful for the buyer.

Integrative issues create opportunities for joint gains (Pruitt, 1981). Unlike distributive negotiations, which are characterized by a single issue, integrative negotiations involve multiple issues (e.g., start date, location, salary). Negotiators may value different outcomes across the issues (e.g., one party may value a particular location, whereas the other party may place more emphasis on a particular start date). In integrative negotiations, parties can structure agreements that create value. Notably, in distributive negotiations, parties can create value simply by finding an agreement, whereas in integrative negotiations, parties can create value by finding efficient tradeoffs across issues (“expanding the pie”) and reaching integrative outcomes (Bazerman & Neale, 1982; Brett & Thompson, 2016; Fisher et al., 2011; Kong et al., 2014; Patton, 2015; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). For example, in a job negotiation, a prospective employee may value where they work more than the start date, whereas the hiring manager may prioritize the start date over the location. By making trades across issues, negotiators can create value (Froman & Cohen, 1970). As a result, a negotiation with many issues, or a negotiator who effectively identifies many issues, can extract substantial value from an agreement.

To transform a distributive negotiation into an integrative negotiation, a vital step is to identify and add additional issues to the negotiation (e.g., buying in bulk, changing the delivery time, etc.). The ability to identify and add issues is a key skill for negotiators, yet the dominant roleplay paradigm pre-identifies negotiation issues. Because this paradigm assigns people to either distributive or integrative negotiations, our knowledge of how to recognize and propose additional issues—with the goal of making negotiations more integrative—is limited. In turn, it is important to note that even within integrative negotiations, there is a dominant, distributive dimension. That is, many integrative negotiations retain a significant distributive component. For example, job or home negotiations may involve multiple integrative issues, whereas salary and price are likely to be dominant distributive issues.

Scholars have also identified *compatible* issues, for which both negotiating parties may want the same outcome (also known as “common value issues”; Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Raiffa, 1982). For example, both the buyer and the seller of a home may want an early closing date. Anticipating the potential for compatible issues is critical, as one party may mislead their counterpart (O’Connor & Carnevale, 1993). For example, a seller who knows that the buyer would like an early closing date may accommodate their counterpart in exchange for a higher price—even when they too would prefer an early closing date (i.e., sandbagging).

A fourth type of issue is indifference, which indicates a lack of value for one of the negotiating parties (Olekalns & Smith, 2007). These are issues that negotiators may introduce to create an opportunity for concessions. For example, an employer may be indifferent to the rotations a new employee completes first. However, by introducing the issue and asserting that they have a preference (when, in reality, they do not), the employer may create an opportunity to extract a concession.

Anticipating Questions And Preparing Responses

In negotiations, people may be asked questions that they do not want to answer (van Beest et al., 2011; Steinel et al., 2009). To effectively prepare for a negotiation, negotiators should anticipate these difficult questions (e.g., “Do you have other offers?” or “How much money did you make in your last

position?"). Strategies for doing this effectively (e.g., perspective-taking, roleplaying) have not been investigated, though scholars have studied different responses to difficult questions. One option is to simply decline to answer; however, people who take this approach—those who choose not to respond to a direct question—may be viewed negatively (e.g., as less trustworthy or less likable) (John et al., 2016). In addition, by refusing to answer a question, people still reveal information. For example, in response to the question, “Do you have other offers?” a person who states, “I would rather not answer” implicitly signals relevant information.

A second type of response involves deception (Gaspar & Schweitzer, 2013; Rogers et al., 2017). In response to a difficult question, people may lie by commission (i.e., by explicitly presenting something false as true). People may also lie by omission when they omit relevant information to project a misleading impression. For example, a negotiation counterpart may assume that a prospective candidate has other offers, and the prospective candidate may intentionally fail to correct this impression. In general, people can improve their negotiation outcomes by lying as long as the deception goes unnoticed. Once deception is detected, however, liars lose trust and suffer both relational and economic costs (see DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; Rogers & Norton, 2011; Rogers et al., 2017; Schweitzer et al., 2006).

A few studies have investigated alternatives to honesty and deception. One alternative involves deflection, or responding to a counterpart with an entirely new question. For example, in response to a question about how much they were paid in their last job, candidates may ask, “What is the most you have paid someone in this position?” Deflection often shifts the conversation to a new topic by violating and then cueing the conversational norm to answer a question (Bitterly & Schweitzer, 2020). In many cases, naïve negotiators fail to return to their initial question and instead follow the conversational flow of the deflection (Bitterly & Schweitzer, 2020). In this way, deflecting unwanted questions can lead to beneficial negotiation outcomes, including more positive evaluations (e.g., greater trust or liking) and less information revealed—without the risk of getting caught trying to deceive the other person.

By preparing to ask and answer difficult questions, negotiators can strategically recognize deflection and address complex topics with ease. In some cases, they can even practice their responses in advance. Without preparation, however, and under time pressure, negotiators may answer difficult questions—deceptively or honestly—in ways that they later regret.

Developing A Concession Plan

In most negotiations, people make concessions as they move closer to the other party’s interests (Pruitt, 1981). Negotiators who develop a concession plan—by considering what first offers to make and how to make subsequent concessions prior to the negotiation—are likely to outperform those who do not. However, the lack of research investigating both concession plans and concession patterns reflects fundamental gaps in our understanding of negotiations. It also highlights an important opportunity for future scholarship.

We do know that concessions reveal information about negotiators’ interests (Weingart et al., 1990), signal cooperation, and cue reciprocity (Thuderoz, 2017). We also know that negotiators are more likely to reach mutually beneficial outcomes when both parties share information and make tradeoffs (Smolinski & Xiong, 2020). Most negotiators are more effective when they prepare concession plans and think in advance about the timing and magnitude of the concessions they make—as well as the concessions they hope to elicit from other parties.

Choosing The Setting

Choosing the negotiation setting may be consequential. However, reflecting the dominant experimental paradigms with which scholars have investigated negotiations, we know surprisingly little about the influence of the negotiation setting, how negotiators choose their negotiation settings, or how negotiators respond to invitations to negotiate in different settings. The limited literature on this topic suggests that negotiators should choose their setting thoughtfully because the negotiation setting is likely to influence how negotiators feel, what they learn about their counterparts, and their negotiated outcomes (Brown & Baer, 2011; Fisher & Ury, 1981; Thompson et al., 2010).

In practice, negotiations occur in a variety of places. Negotiators may choose to meet in an office conference room, or they may complete a negotiation by phone or email; alternatively, negotiators may convene in settings such as entertainment or sporting venues (e.g., on the golf green), restaurants, bars, and even strip clubs (Schweitzer & Kerr, 2000). These settings can create opportunities for rapport building, though they also present potential challenges. For example, when meeting at a bar, negotiators are likely to consume alcohol. Depending on the amount of alcohol that the parties consume—along with the food they have eaten and their relative experience with alcohol—this could lead to certain advantages and disadvantages in a negotiation (Morewedge et al., 2014; Schweitzer & Gomberg, 2001). Accordingly, rather than giving little thought to the negotiation setting, deliberately choosing an ideal setting is a key step in the preparation process.

Prior work on the negotiation setting has focused on whether negotiators should meet in their own offices or in their counterpart's office. Fisher and Ury (1981) suggest that negotiators meet in their counterpart's office, as this setting affords an opportunity to learn more about the other party. Personality research supports this intuition because the way in which people organize their personal spaces (e.g., number of photos, decoration style, level of tidiness) signals information about their personality (Gosling et al., 2002). However, conducting a negotiation in a familiar environment can confer advantages (Thompson et al., 2010). Specifically, negotiating in a familiar space makes negotiators feel more comfortable, more confident, and better equipped to negotiate successfully (Brown & Baer, 2011; Chu et al., 2005). For example, negotiators with "home field advantage" outperformed their counterparts in a distributive negotiation, which may also reflect a visitor disadvantage (Brown & Baer, 2011).

Pre-Negotiation Meetings

Though leading scholars have identified setting the stage as the most important negotiation phase (see Fisher et al., 2011; Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007; Thompson, 2015), fundamental questions about setting the stage for negotiations remain unexplored. For instance, we know surprisingly little about how people actually prepare for negotiations—both in negotiation experiments and in the field (Malhotra, 2015; Thompson et al., 2010). One exception involves work on topic selection during pre-negotiation meetings. Research shows that conversations about shared superordinate goals (i.e., outcomes that both parties desire but cannot attain on their own) can build mutual trust and lead to joint gains (Swaab et al., 2021).

Mindsets

People may go into their negotiations with different mindsets; how people select, encode, and retrieve information can affect evaluations and behavior (Rucker & Galinsky, 2016). That is, the mindsets negotiators adopt can predictably influence their behavior and their negotiated outcomes (Trötschel et al., 2011). This stream of negotiation scholarship emerged alongside the judgment and decision-making literature; as a result, much of this scholarship applies features of prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) and related judgment biases. One key example involves framing outcomes in terms of gains versus losses (Rabin, 1998; see Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).

Gain/loss

Robust scholarship has examined framing effects, which investigate the impact of highlighting a situation as either a gain or a loss (Larrick & Blount, 1997; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This work has found that when a potential agreement is framed as a relative loss (versus a relative gain), negotiators become less cooperative, less likely to make concessions, and more likely to reach an impasse (Bazerman et al., 1982; Bottom & Studt, 1993; De Dreu et al., 1994; 1995; Kahneman, 1992; McCusker & Carnevale, 1995; Neale & Bazerman, 1985; Olekalns, 1994; 1997; Olekalns & Frey, 1994; Schweitzer & DeChurch, 2001; Trotschel et al., 2013; Trotschel & Gollwitzer, 2007; Trotschel et al., 2015). This is thought to occur because people experience loss aversion; in other words, they may experience a loss as more painful than the corresponding gains are enjoyable, which prompts them to avoid losses in general (De Dreu & McCusker, 1997; Meyerowitz & Chaiken, 1987; Schneider, 1992; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Negotiator concessions (losses) “loom larger” than a counterpart’s concessions (gains), making negotiation concessions very difficult.

Subsequent work also examined how framing specific moves within a negotiation (e.g., first offers), rather than the negotiation itself, affects negotiator behavior. Specifically, framing a request as a loss (or a request for resources) rather than a gain (or an offer of resources) induces greater concession aversion, and thus, fewer counterpart concessions (Trotschel et al., 2015; Majer et al., 2020). In this way, framing a move as a request (loss) rather than an offer (gain) can eliminate or reverse the anchoring effect that occurs from first offers and ultimately lead to stronger counteroffers (Majer et al., 2020). That is, by framing negotiation outcomes in terms of minimizing costs (losses) or maximizing profits (gains), negotiators can influence both the negotiation process and the negotiation outcomes (De Dreu et al., 1994; Levin et al., 1998; Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994; Bazerman et al., 1985).

Asking frames and conflict frames

Negotiation scholarship has also considered other types of frames. For example, framing a negotiation as an opportunity to ask (rather than negotiate) mitigated women’s relative aversion to initiating a negotiation (Small et al., 2007).

Other scholarship identified conflict frames (Pinkley, 1990). For example, people may perceive negotiations through a collaborative lens (a cooperative frame) or a competitive lens (win/lose frame). Research shows that loss framing can cause negotiators to be more likely to adopt a competitive frame (Schweitzer & DeChurch, 2001), which in turn can promote deception.

Construal level

One mindset that negotiation scholars have investigated quite extensively is construal level. Construal level theory (Liberman & Trope, 2008; Trope & Liberman, 2003; 2010) proposes that people's mental representations may vary from abstract (i.e., high-level) to concrete (i.e., low-level) representations. Abstract thinking (e.g., seeing the forest but not the trees) differs greatly from concrete, detailed thinking (e.g., seeing individual trees but losing sight of the forest) (Burgoon et al., 2013; Rosch, 1975; Rosch et al., 1976; Trope & Liberman, 2003; 2010; see Ledgerwood et al., 2010). Construal level is impacted by the psychological distance that people perceive to have between a focal object and objects or events at farther distances. Psychological distance has temporal (present vs. future), spatial (near vs. far), and social (in-group vs. out-group) dimensions. For example, negotiation scholars have induced psychological distance using a time-delayed outcome (Okhuysen et al., 2003), or by having participants write about temporally close or distant events (De Dreu et al., 2009).

Negotiation scholarship has found that higher-level or abstract (vs. low-level or concrete) construal may prompt negotiators to act more cooperatively and achieve better joint outcomes (De Dreu et al., 2009; Giacomantonio et al., 2010; Henderson et al., 2006; Henderson & Trope, 2009; Kortenkamp & Moore, 2006; Okhuysen et al., 2003; Stillman et al., 2018; Wening et al., 2016; see Wiesenfeld et al., 2017). This is thought to occur because higher levels of construal enable negotiators to take a "big-picture" perspective and focus on multiple issues rather than single issues (Henderson et al., 2006; Henderson & Trope, 2009). In addition, higher levels of construal allow negotiators to exchange information more thoroughly (Wening et al., 2016) and focus more on their long-term relationship with the other negotiating party (or parties) (Wiesenfeld et al., 2017).

Regulatory fit

Another mindset negotiation scholars have considered is "regulatory focus," whether people are primarily focused on gaining something valuable versus avoiding the loss of something valuable (Higgins, 1998). For example, scholars have instructed negotiators to think about (a) "behaviors and outcomes [they] hope to achieve" and how they could "promote these behaviors and outcomes" (promotion mindset), and (b) "negotiation behaviors and outcomes [they] seek to avoid ... and how [they] could prevent these behaviors and outcomes" (prevention mindset) (Galinsky et al., 2005, p. 1092). Both Galinsky et al. (2005) and Peng et al. (2015) found that negotiators instructed to adopt a promotion mindset attained better negotiated outcomes than those instructed to adopt a prevention mindset. Apparently, negotiators who adopt a promotion-oriented mindset are better at creating and claiming value than prevention-oriented negotiators. Quite possibly, people engaging in Opportunity Negotiations, compared to Dispute Negotiations, may be more likely to adopt a promotion-oriented mindset. Future work is needed to explore this possibility and to deepen our understanding of the relationship between a promotion-prevention mindset, gain/loss framing, and conflict frames (e.g., Schweitzer & DeChurch, 2001).

Phase 1: Setting The Stage: Conclusion

The lack of research on negotiation preparation is striking. Scholars should investigate not only how negotiators prepare, but also how different aspects of setting the stage can influence the negotiation process and negotiated outcomes. Specifically, additional research is needed to investigate the following questions: As negotiators prepare, what factors moderate how effective they are at identifying key information that they should seek or conceal? In turn, what factors moderate which questions negotiators should ask or anticipate? Future research should also investigate

preparation for making first offers, concession plans, and identifying key current and potential issues to add to a negotiation, as well as the interplay between making first offers and concessions on the exchange of information.

Phase 2: Communicating

In the communicating phase, negotiators interact with each other as they strive to achieve their goals. These goals may include building a relationship, learning information, or seeking an outcome that improves the status quo. The classic experimental paradigm scholars have used to study negotiations is well-suited to the study of communicating, which is the most investigated phase of the negotiation process (see Jang et al., 2018). This review highlights nine distinct elements of the communication process: Non-task communication, exchange of information, distributive and integrative bargaining, first offers, concessions, persuasion, trust, deception, and emotion. Below, each of these elements is considered in turn, though it is important to note that many negotiations will include only some of them; it is also important to recognize that the communicating phase does not occur linearly. That is, negotiators may skip some parts of the communicating phase—for instance, non-task communication—or they may go back and forth between parts, such as between persuasion and making concessions.

Non-Task Communication

Many negotiations begin with non-task communication, or communication that is not directly related to the task at hand (e.g., “How is your family?”). Scholars have studied the role of non-task communication in building rapport—both in negotiation settings and in related, competitive domains such as sales and detective-led interrogations (Morris et al., 2002; Galinsky & Schweitzer, 2015). Non-task communication may cover a range of topics, including the weather, sports, and favorite foods. These discussions may take hours as individuals seek to build rapport with one another (Galinsky & Schweitzer, 2015). In negotiations, non-task communication may vary from short opening statements such as “How was your trip?” to touring sites together, sharing meals, or making rounds of toasts (Smolinski & Xiong, 2020; Schweitzer & Kerr, 2000).

A few studies have explored non-task communication in negotiation, and this research suggests that it offers substantial benefits. Specifically, scholars have found that negotiators can derive substantial benefits by beginning a negotiation with rapport building by “schmoozing”—engaging in relationship-focused, non-task communication (Morris et al., 1999; Shaughnessy et al., 2015)—or via “cheap talk”—engaging in communication unrelated to the task at hand (Bottom et al., 2006). Non-task communication can enable parties to discover similarities in attitudes, values, and interests (Ferrin et al., 2008); it may also promote greater information exchange and cooperation (Bottom et al., 2006; Katz, 2015; Mislin et al., 2011; Morris et al., 2002), encourage more positive emotions (Moore et al., 1999; Morris et al., 2002; Tiedens et al., 1999), and facilitate trust (see Lu et al., 2017).

Though this literature is underdeveloped in relation to the likely importance of non-task communication, scholars have linked this communication with negotiation outcomes (Morris et al., 2000). Specifically, studies have found that negotiators who engaged in non-task communication set more realistic goals, identified a larger range of possible outcomes, and were less likely to experience impasses during a negotiation (Moore et al., 1999; Morris et al., 2002; Thompson & Nadler, 2002).

Exchange Of Information

The second part of the communicating phase is the exchange of information. During this process, negotiators reveal and seek information. Typically, this exchange happens as negotiators ask and answer questions.

Asking questions

A key part of the information exchange process involves asking and answering questions. Scholars have asserted that negotiators should become “investigators” by asking questions to learn about their counterpart’s BATNA, reservation value, and interests (Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007). Of course, important information can be gathered while setting the stage for a negotiation, but the extent to which negotiators can learn relevant information through preparation is limited, and the exchange of information during the communicating phase is integral to gaining insights that can inform the exchange of offers.

Negotiators should ask direct questions, even if they believe that the other party may not fully answer them. By doing so, they can elicit useful information (Huang et al., 2018; Minson et al., 2018; Schweitzer & Croson, 1999; Thompson & Hastie, 1990). Conversational norms may compel negotiators to answer questions, as people often feel a sense of responsibility to answer questions that they are asked (Mazar et al., 2008; Rogers & Norton, 2011; Wiltermuth et al., 2015). Interestingly, even sensitive questions (e.g., “How much money do you make?”) tend to elicit truthful or very informative responses—without causing the relational harm that question-askers fear (Hart et al., 2021; Minson et al., 2018). Even when negotiation counterparts do not answer questions, negotiators can learn significant information (John et al., 2016). For example, when a negotiation counterpart declines to answer whether they have another offer, the other party can still make useful inferences.

When asking questions, negotiators should focus on key information that they intend to learn. Negotiators should also be mindful of how they phrase their questions (Fisher et al., 2011; Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007; Thompson, 2015). For example, negative-assumption questions—or questions that presume a problem (e.g., “How many accidents has the car been in?”)—are more likely to elicit truthful responses (Minson et al., 2018).

A key part of the exchange of information process involves listening to how people answer questions, rather than simply focusing on “selling” (as many novice negotiators do). Listening to the other party’s interests, needs, priorities, and constraints will be vital in maximizing the value each party can create. Finally, negotiators should be aware of any assumptions that they may have when entering a negotiation; they should also ask questions that challenge these assumptions rather than assume they are correct and seek confirming evidence.

Communicating information

As negotiators share information with their counterpart, they may cue reciprocity and inspire their counterpart to share information in turn (Gouldner, 1960; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Of course, when sharing information, negotiators should do so strategically. As with making concessions, negotiators should ensure they are receiving information as they share information, and recognize the value of any information that they disclose.

In general, negotiators should not reveal their reservation point to the opposing party (Raiffa, 1982; Thompson, 2015), as negotiators who reveal this information are likely to reach an agreement near that point. When facing the prospect of an impasse, however, disclosing a reservation price may improve the likelihood of reaching a deal.

In multi-issue negotiations, negotiators should try to convey information about their relative priorities—without minimizing the importance of any one issue (Fisher et al., 2011; Thompson, 2015). This allows negotiators to communicate truthfully about the issues that they value most, without providing an opportunity for their counterpart to gain an advantage. One approach to communicating relative priorities is to make simultaneous offers across multiple issues (Leonardelli et al., 2019). By assessing a counterpart's preference for different proposals, negotiators can learn about the party's preferences and priorities across contexts.

When communicating information, negotiators should think about their goals for the conversation and how they might achieve them. Goals can be classified along two dimensions: informational (i.e., a focus on giving and/or receiving accurate information) and relational (i.e., a focus on building the relationship) (Yeomans et al., 2022). By reflecting on both their own and their counterpart's conversational goals, negotiators can choose effective communication strategies and more accurately interpret information from the other party. For example, if an opposing party has a high informational goal, they will likely provide accurate information by asking questions and exchanging information; conversely, if they have a low informational goal, they may conceal key information by dodging questions or sharing irrelevant, distracting information. A negotiator's goals may differ depending on the type of negotiation.

Distributive And Integrative Bargaining

Distributive bargaining involves splitting a pie, whereas integrative bargaining involves both expanding and splitting a pie (see Table 1). Though the dichotomy between distributive and integrative bargaining has been carefully distinguished in negotiation experiments, this dichotomy may be less clear in practical settings.

Distributive negotiations are characterized by several key features. They require concessions from both parties (Neale & Fragale, 2006; Thompson, 2006). Compared to integrative negotiations, they tend to be more contentious and adversarial (Adair & Brett, 2005; Brett & Thompson, 2016; Kong et al., 2014; Liu & Wilson, 2011; Olekalns & Smith, 2000; Weingart et al., 1990). Similarly, negotiators in distributive negotiations are more likely to adopt a win/lose mentality and try to claim as much value as they can. For example, in distributive negotiations, people are more likely to conceal information, reveal information selectively, make extreme first offers, make few or minor concessions, and show little concern for the other party. When negotiators focus on distributive issues, they often adopt a zero-sum approach that does not seek to “expand the pie” or reach integrative outcomes because these issues, on their own, inherently involve a loss to one party when the other party gains (Bazerman & Neale, 1983; Brett & Thompson, 2016; Kong et al., 2014; Liu & Wilson, 2011; Olekalns & Smith, 2000; Weingart et al., 1990). This self-interested approach may indicate greed to some extent; it has also been found to reflect a concern about a risk of exploitation (Kong et al., 2014). Typically, these negotiations are competitive and occur between parties with short-term relationships. Quite possibly, negotiators could reach more efficient agreements by identifying opportunities to transform a distributive negotiation into an integrative one. The path to do this is likely to involve building rapport, cultivating trust, and diminishing a counterpart's

concerns about exploitation, so that people are more likely to reveal information that leads them to discover integrative solutions.

In contrast to distributive negotiations, people in integrative negotiations can create value by identifying mutually-beneficial trades. In these negotiations, parties can make concessions on issues that are less important to them in exchange for concessions on issues that they value more; this is a social exchange known as logrolling (Froman & Cohen, 1970). Compared to distributive negotiations, people involved in integrative negotiations are more likely to adopt a win/win mentality, cooperate, and embrace a problem-solving mindset (Adair & Brett, 2005; Brett & Thompson, 2016; Fisher et al., 1981; Kong et al., 2014; Liu & Wilson, 2011; Olekalns & Smith, 2000; Weingart et al., 1990). For example, compared to people engaged in distributive negotiations, those engaged in integrative negotiations are more likely to openly share information about their interests and priorities with the other party, make reasonable first offers, engage in knowledge sharing, and show concern for the other party's interests. In integrative negotiations, people are more likely to focus on their underlying interests (rather than positions) and consider multiple issues. Compared to distributive negotiations, integrative negotiations tend to be more cooperative (and more likely to occur between parties with longer-term relationships).

Creative negotiators can make almost every distributive negotiation an integrative negotiation by adding an issue. For example, salary negotiations may include different start dates, purchasing negotiations may include bulk discounts, and home purchases may include keeping some of the client's existing furniture. Adding issues can transform a distributive negotiation an integrative one—that is, one in which both parties can achieve gains from the negotiation. This process may also help to transform perceptions of the negotiation process, shifting the negotiation from a purely competitive (fixed-pied) process to a more collaborative one.

Rather than reflecting a dichotomy, distributive versus integrative negotiations may involve a continuum. First, even purely distributive negotiations feature an integrative opportunity—that is, if parties reach an agreement that benefits both sides. Second, many distributive negotiations can become integrative negotiations (by adding additional issues, for example). And third, many integrative negotiations have a dominant distributive issue, such as salary or price. The extent to which integrative negotiations are characterized by a dominant distributive issue reflects a continuum.

Which issues to negotiate first

The complexity of the negotiation, and of the relationship between counterparts, can determine which issues to negotiate first. Ideally, negotiators will exchange offers that include values for every issue. In many cases, however, this is difficult, and negotiators may choose instead to negotiate issues sequentially (one at a time).

In contentious negotiations, negotiators may seek to reach agreement on an easy issue in order to build trust and momentum. In other cases, however, they may tackle the hardest issue first—because if a deal cannot be reached on the most contentious issue, the rest of the negotiation could falter. We know very little about the moderators that are likely to make one of these approaches more successful than the other. In addition, discussing multiple issues simultaneously—especially for complex negotiations—may be beneficial because it can help negotiators identify tradeoffs and ensure a non-zero-sum negotiation (Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007).

The best approach may depend on context. For example, when relationship conflict is high, starting with an easy issue could be an effective way to build momentum and lay the foundation for a future agreement. Additionally, negotiating groups with lower power may prefer negotiating more consequential issues first, whereas groups with higher power generally prefer negotiating less consequential issues first to maintain their position (Kteily et al., 2013). In general, however, to reach efficient agreements, negotiators should consider the full set of issues together.

Common interest issues

Negotiations may involve compatible issues known as common interest or common value issues (Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Raiffa, 1982). In negotiations, individuals may feign interest in an issue that they know the other party values in order to gain concessions on other issues (O'Connor & Carnevale, 1997). For example, in a divorce negotiation, a father may feign interest in retaining custody of the children—not because he actually wants custody, but because he knows that he could concede this issue to gain concessions on other issues later on in the negotiation (e.g., who gets to keep the house, cars, and yacht). Thus, in some cases, negotiators should be cautious when thinking about expressing their preferences; they should also invest resources in gauging their counterpart's preferences. The possibility of being exploited makes asking questions early (e.g., the buyer might ask the seller "What closing date do you prefer?") especially important. Concerns about exploitation and feigned interest are lessened in collaborative contexts where people hold cooperative versus individualistic motives (O'Connor & Carnevale, 1997).

First Offers

A key part of the communicating phase is the exchange of offers. A substantial literature has explored offers in negotiation. Almost all of this work, however, has focused on first offers. This research has found that first offers can exert a substantial influence on negotiation outcomes. Specifically, negotiators often achieve better outcomes when they make assertive first offers (Benton et al., 1972; Chertkoff & Conley, 1967; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2011; Liebert et al., 1968); this is because first offers can anchor the negotiation and influence a counterpart's expectations and concessions (Adair et al., 2007; Ames & Mason, 2015; Galinsky et al., 2005; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Galinsky et al., 2002; Gunia et al., 2013; Neal & Bazerman, 1991; Sinaceur et al., 2013). Once anchored by a first offer, negotiators often fail to sufficiently adjust away from the anchor (Epley & Gilovich, 2001; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2011; Jeong et al., 2020). Reflecting the robustness of these effects, scholars have documented such patterns across settings and cultures (Barry et al., 2015; Gunia et al., 2013).

Making and responding to a first offer

When making a first offer, negotiators should have sufficient knowledge of their bargaining zone. This can help them avoid making an offer that leaves value on the table, or that is so excessive that it prompts the other party to exit the negotiation (Lee et al., 2018; see Galinsky et al., 2009). Gathering information plays a critical role in finding the right balance. Scholars have suggested that negotiators use their aspiration price to inform their first offer and make aggressive first offers, but how this works in practice remains an open question (Benton et al., 1972; Chertkoff & Conley, 1967; Fisher et al., 2011; Malhotra & Bazerman, 2008; Thompson, 2015). Prior work has found that


aggressive first offers are beneficial for several reasons (see Gunia, 2013). First, they anchor the negotiation and provide room for a negotiator to make concessions (increasing the other party's perceptions that the negotiator is cooperative and boosting the likelihood of a better outcome). Second, an aggressive first offer allows negotiators to focus on their own aspiration price, while encouraging their counterpart to focus on their reservation price (Galinsky et al., 2002; Mussweiler et al., 2000). Conversely, by making less aggressive first offers, negotiators may attain poor outcomes, elicit obstinate behavior from their counterpart, and obtain small concessions (Chertkoff & Conley, 1967). This finding is consistent with work that has found that negotiators who express gratitude are more likely to be exploited by their counterparts than those who do not (Yip et al., working paper).

However, most findings that support an assertive first offer derive from negotiation experiments in which the parties have few options to leave the negotiation and seek other counterparts. That is, we know surprisingly little about when negotiators are most likely to walk away from a negotiation. For example, if a tourist ventures into an art gallery and asks about a painting, when will an aggressive first offer prompt them to visit the art gallery across the street? Reflecting this possibility, generous first offers can increase trust and elicit more generous responses from a counterpart (Jeong et al., 2020).

In contrast to some popular press advice—"never make the first offer"—negotiators can make the first offer when they have a good sense of the bargaining zone. That is, they should only make the first offer when they know their own reservation price and also have a sense of their counterpart's reservation price (see Gunia, 2013). This advice is consistent with related work that underscores the importance of asking questions and exchanging information, rather than jumping immediately to the exchange of offers. By delaying the exchange of offers, negotiators may exchange more information and ultimately reach more creative agreements (Sinaceur et al., 2013).

We know little about how negotiators should react to first offers. One scholarly concern is that negotiators may become anchored on a counterpart's first offer (Fisher et al., 2011; Malhotra & Bazerman, 2008; Thompson, 2015). Scholars have encouraged negotiators to avoid falling prey to anchoring, but there is minimal literature on how to do this. Some have suggested that negotiators respond to an assertive first offer with their own aggressive counteroffer (Lipp et al., 2023), and then bring up the possibility of working together to bridge the gap (see Figure 3 for a depiction of the exchange of offers). Additionally, perspective-taking may be an effective way to counter the anchoring effects of an opposing party's first offer (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). Yet throughout, preparation is an important stage of the negotiation process, helping negotiators avoid falling prey to anchoring.

Figure 3: The Negotiation Dance



Note: In a distributive negotiation, Sellers and Buyers exchange offers. In this example, the Seller starts by offering to sell at P_5 , and the Buyer counters by offering to buy at P_1 . The seller then offers to sell at P_4 , the buyer offers to pay P_2 , and the parties ultimately agree on a final price of P_3 . Negotiation dances are often (but not always) characterized by monotonic concessions (e.g., $P_3 < P_4 < P_5$): larger concessions at the beginning of a dance (e.g., $(P_5 - P_4) > (P_4 - P_3)$), followed by reciprocal concessions (e.g., $(P_5 - P_4)$ similar to $(P_2 - P_1)$), with negotiators often splitting the difference at the end (e.g., P_3 similar to $(P_4 - P_2)/2$).

Anchoring

First offers influence final outcomes by shifting expectations and by anchoring a counterpart. Anchoring occurs when people overweigh the influence of an initial value (Klein et al., 2014; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In negotiations, first offers heavily influence perceptions of value and final prices (Whyte & Sebenius, 1997). Even phantom anchors—or aggressive offers that are immediately retracted—can influence negotiators (Bhatia & Gunia, 2018). For example, when a seller states, “I was going to ask for \$10,000, but I can offer \$9,000,” their counterpart may still be influenced by the \$10,000 anchor and perceive the \$9,000 offer as a discount. Phantom anchors can cause negotiation counterparts to make less aggressive counteroffers and enable negotiators to reach more favorable outcomes; however, negotiators who use phantom anchors may be perceived as manipulative (Bhatia & Gunia, 2018).

Ranges

Rather than offering a specific value (e.g., “I can sell the car for \$37,000”), negotiators can use ranges (e.g., “I can sell the car for \$35,000 to \$40,000”). Several scholars have asserted that it is better to make a first offer with a specific value rather than a range, because specific values are more likely to

be used as anchors—and because specific values signal that the negotiator is well-informed, deliberate, and competent (Mason et al., 2013; Loschelder et al., 2017; Janiszewski & Uy, 2008). However, other work suggests that precise offers may signal inflexibility (Lee et al., 2018). In addition, when negotiating with an expert who has a sense of the bargaining zone, an assertive specific value outside this zone may signal incompetence (Loschelder, 2016). Thus, ranges may be advantageous when negotiators lack a good sense of the bargaining zone and still want to signal flexibility.

Using ranges in a first offer can convey both (1) an informational effect: the endpoints of the range signal a negotiator's reservation price and can anchor the negotiation, and (2) a politeness effect: the range can dampen extreme offers and make extreme counteroffers seem less polite (Ames & Mason, 2015). A “bolstering range,” or a range that starts with an aggressive first offer as the low point of the range and then goes higher, can yield both positive economic and positive relational outcomes. A “bracketing range,” meanwhile, or a range in which the aggressive first offer is in the middle, confers relationship benefits—but it does not yield economic benefits. In general, wide ranges do not lead to more favorable deals than narrow ones (Ames & Mason, 2015).

Concessions

When exchanging offers, negotiators make concessions to their counterpart (Pruitt, 1981). Concessions strongly influence the trajectory of negotiations, affecting both negotiator satisfaction and outcomes (Benton et al., 1972; Chertkoff & Conley, 1967; Yukl, 1974). We know surprisingly little, however, about concession patterns and how they influence economic and relational outcomes in negotiations.

Though little empirical work supports this assertion, negotiators should anticipate both first offers and any concessions that they plan to make before they start a negotiation. That is, negotiators should identify key issues, issues that may be added to the negotiation, and potential concession plans as they prepare to negotiate. Ideally, negotiators should concede on the issues that are of least importance to them, make smaller concessions over the course of the negotiation, and ensure that every party is conceding, rather than making unilateral concessions. Though little empirical work supports these assertions, experimental work has shown that by making smaller concessions over time, negotiators signal to their counterparts that they are approaching their reservation price (Tey et al., 2021).

Preparing to make concessions is generally difficult. Through the information exchange process, negotiators may learn about the issues that matter most to their counterpart, and subsequently identify opportunities to make concessions that their counterpart will value for the lowest reasonable cost.

A few studies inform the art and science of making concessions, though further research is needed given the centrality of this topic to the negotiation process. Thompson (2015) suggests that when making concessions, negotiators should provide explanations. Very little empirical work supports or informs the concession-making process, but by justifying each concession, negotiators can highlight—and perhaps gain recognition for—the concessions that they make. Ultimately, such explanations may trigger reciprocity, resulting in better economic and relational outcomes. We know very little, however, about factors such as how negotiators should frame their concessions, or how often negotiators should revisit past concessions that they have made. One concern is reactive

devaluation (Ross, 1995; Ross & Ward, 1995), which indicates that after making a concession, a counterpart may assume that the concession was easy to make.

Negotiators should also consider the timing of their concessionary behavior. Importantly, they should avoid making quick concessions, because this may cause their counterpart to expect additional concessions (and reduce the likelihood of reciprocity) (Chertkoff & Conley, 1967; Komorita & Barnes, 1969; Pruitt, 1981; Siegel & Fouraker, 1960; Smith et al., 1982). Instead, negotiators should make gradual concessions throughout the negotiation in order to increase both parties' satisfaction (Kwon & Weingart, 2004).

In general, concessions by one party prompt reciprocity (Benton et al., 1972; Chertkoff & Conley, 1967). However, aspects of the negotiation itself are likely to affect concessionary behavior, and importantly, some features of the negotiation process may cause one party to make greater concessions than another. For example, negotiations with high time pressure typically increase concession making (Carnevale et al., 1993; Hamner, 1974; Lim & Murnighan, 1994; Pruitt & Drews, 1969). In some cases, negotiators may even stall the negotiation process to gain a relative advantage (Kang et al., 2020).

High time pressure can also create a mismatch in concessionary behavior between parties. There are many cases in which negotiators may be relatively advantaged by the passage of time because it benefits their but in some cases. In some cases, negotiators may stall the negotiation to create time pressure or gain a relative advantage.

Persuasion

Part of the communication process involves convincing a counterpart that they should accept less favorable terms. However, little negotiation scholarship has focused on influence and persuasion tactics. The influence and persuasion literatures in the context of social psychology and management feature extensive recommendations and applications. Specifically, there are many opportunities for scholars to advance public understanding of how negotiators can persuade their counterpart to reveal information or agree to a deal. For example, our knowledge of escalation of commitment, reciprocity, and the use of social comparisons in negotiation is limited (see Novemsky & Schweitzer, 2001; Malhotra & Bazerman, 2008; Thompson, 2015, for exceptions). In one investigation, negotiators were less persuasive when they added arguments while making their first offer (Maaravi et al., 2011).

Additionally, negotiation scholarship has underexplored the influence of cues as a form of persuasion. In one important exception, artifacts, such as expensive clothing or a fancy car, were shown to signal wealth (and a higher willingness to pay) to a negotiation counterpart and influenced the types of offers negotiators received (Maaravi & Hameiri, 2019).

Trust

A major influence during the communicating phase is trust between negotiators. Both within and separate from the negotiation literature, scholars have extensively researched the notion of trust (Campagna et al., 2016; Gunia et al., 2011; Kong, 2015; Kong et al., 2014; Naquin & Paulson, 2003; Olekalns & Smith, 2005, 2007, 2009; Sinaceur, 2010). Building closely on prior work, trust is defined as one party's willingness to be vulnerable to another based on positive expectations (Rousseau et

al., 1999, p. 395). The core bases for trust are competence, benevolence, and integrity (Mayer et al., 1995); competence reflects perceptions of ability, benevolence reflects care and concern for others, and integrity reflects a commitment to values such as honesty and credibility (Colquitt et al., 2007; Mayer & Davis, 1999).

Benefits of trust

Trust leads to substantial benefits in negotiation. It promotes cooperative behavior and collaboration, all while decreasing competitive behaviors (Bottom et al., 2006; Butler Jr, 1999; De Dreu et al., 2003; Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Ferrin et al., 2008; Gunia et al., 2011; Kimmel et al., 1980; Mislin et al., 2011; Pillutla et al., 2003; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; see Kong et al., 2014). With high levels of trust, people attain better negotiation outcomes (Schurr & Ozanne, 1985; Mislin et al., 2011; Kong et al., 2014; Olekalns & Smith, 2007), higher post-negotiation satisfaction (Kong et al., 2014), and greater commitment to deal implementation (Bottom et al., 2006; Mislin et al., 2011).

When facing a reticent negotiation counterpart, negotiators should seek to build trust. Some may feel anxious about the prospect of negotiation (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011), and trust can help one party mitigate their counterpart's fear of exploitation. This process may involve building rapport, engaging in non-task communication, sharing some information, and taking non-verbal communication steps such as shaking hands (Schroeder et al., 2019) or leveraging mimicry (Huffaker et al., 2011; Swaab et al., 2011; Ireland & Henderson, 2014; Maddux et al., 2008). Ultimately, these efforts can increase trust, feelings of like, and cooperation.

Trust is an important ingredient in effective negotiations (Thompson et al., 2010; Bazerman & Neale, 1992). When negotiating parties experience high levels of trust, they may feel more comfortable taking risks, including by sharing information and structuring creative solutions (e.g., paying someone in advance). However, people who misplace their trust are more vulnerable to exploitation (Kong et al., 2014; Yip & Schweitzer, 2015).

Antecedents of trust

Several studies have identified antecedents of trust. One factor is a history of positive interactions (Schilke et al., 2023). Though a history of positive interactions is important, many experiences reflect censored environments. For example, managers may only observe how hard their team works when they are in the same room as their employees. When managers are unable to directly observe their subordinates, they may presume that their employees are working just as hard as they were when they were directly observing them. If, however, employees work harder when they know that they are being observed (and less hard when they know that they are not being observed), manager observations may reflect a censored environment. In practice, many settings reflect such environments. The core problem is that people systematically misplace their trust by over-relying on the biased sample of what they observe, and by failing to imagine how differently people behave when they are not observed (Schweitzer & Ho, 2005; Schweitzer et al., 2018).

In accordance with the importance of benevolence, people are far more trusting of others when they observe a commitment to the relationship. For example, when people engage in non-task communication in a negotiation (e.g., small talk), they engender greater levels of trust (Mislin et al., 2011; Morris et al., 2002). Similarly, expressing positive emotion (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Mislin et al., 2015), and then taking actions that foster rapport, such as asking questions, sharing information,

and demonstrating empathic concern, can further promote trust (Butler, 1999; Brooks et al., 2014; Lu et al., 2017).

Assessing trustworthiness is difficult, and building trust takes time (see Schilke et al., 2023 for a review). Though people are sensitive to many trust cues, the extent to which a person is guilt-prone is particularly important; guilt-prone people (e.g., those who would feel very guilty if they spilled red wine on someone's white carpet) are far more trustworthy than those who are less guilt-prone (Levine et al., 2018).

Breaking and restoring trust

Trust is frequently violated, both inadvertently and intentionally. In negotiations, trust is especially fraught, because nearly every negotiation involves elements of competition. In this context, many quotidian negotiation behaviors can harm trust. For example, adopting a competitive tone, using threats (Mislin et al., 2011; Morris et al., 2002), and expressing negative emotion can all hinder trust (van Kleef et al., 2010). In negotiations, trust is often violated when people are caught lying (Schweitzer et al., 2005).

Though the process is difficult, negotiators can take measures to repair trust (Lewicki & Brinsfield, 2017; Gillespie & Dietz, 2009; Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2000). Two key steps negotiators can take to restore trust include (a) delivering an effective apology (Schweitzer et al., 2015), and (b) exhibiting a consistent set of trustworthy actions (Schweitzer et al., 2006). A key component of an effective apology is a promise to change (Schweitzer et al., 2006). Tailoring the apology to the context and making credible attributions are equally critical (Kim et al., 2006).

Deception

Deception represents a particularly important challenge in negotiations. Since negotiations are characterized by information asymmetries and information dependence (Murnighan et al., 1999; Schweitzer & Croson, 1999; Schweitzer & Hsee, 2002), negotiators can gather a great deal of information as they prepare to negotiate—yet almost every negotiation includes unique information that individuals can only glean from the negotiation process itself. In many cases, negotiators can gain an advantage—at least in the short-term—by misleading a counterpart. As a result, deception is common in negotiations (Gaspar & Schweitzer, 2013; Gaspar & Schweitzer, 2021; Glac et al., 2014; Gunia & Levine, 2019; Koning et al., 2011; Kray et al., 2014; Minson et al., 2018; Rees et al., 2019; Tenbrunsel, 1998).

Deception is defined as any communication intended to mislead another party (Gaspar et al., 2015; Gaspar et al., 2022). In negotiations, some types of deception are more serious than others. Misrepresenting a budget or bottom line, for example, is so common that it is almost expected in a negotiation context (e.g., “I can’t pay more than \$200!” when the party can actually pay \$250). Misrepresenting a material fact on which the counterpart relies, however, may constitute fraud (Shell, 1991). It is worth noting that there are many types of deception between these two extremes (see Lewicki & Robinson, 1998; Lewicki & Stark, 1996; Robinson et al., 2000; Schweitzer & Hsee, 2002). In negotiations, deception typically involves misrepresenting information, but it may also involve emotional misrepresentation (Kang & Schweitzer, 2022; Gaspar & Schweitzer, 2013; Fulmer et al., 2009).

Verbal deception

Most prior work has studied verbal misrepresentation with text that misrepresents the true state of the world (e.g., “The car has never been in an accident”; O’Connor & Carnevale, 1997; Shell, 1991; Lewicki & Robinson, 1998; Robinson et al., 2000). In negotiations, people may misrepresent different types of information, from their budget limit or their intentions, to fundamental facts of the case.

Scholars have also distinguished lies based on the types of statements that deceivers use. Lies of commission are active misstatements (e.g., “I have no plans to hire non-union workers for this project” when the opposite is true; see Lewicki & Robinson, 1998; Lewicki & Stark, 1996; Robinson et al., 2000). Lies of omission, meanwhile, involve a failure to disclose pertinent information. For example, a negotiating party may assume that their counterpart has no plans to hire non-union workers. The counterpart may know that the other party holds this mistaken impression and intentionally fail to correct it. In this case, the negotiator has lied by omission and is generally considered less culpable than if they had lied by commission; people targeted by lies of omission may share a greater portion of responsibility for the deception (Ren et al., 2022; Schweitzer & Croson, 1999).

Other work has considered different forms of deception. Paltering, for example, involves the misleading use of truthful statements to create a false impression. For example, suppose that a union representative is concerned that the manager will hire non-union workers in the coming year. In this example, further suppose that the manager does intend to hire non-union workers, but that they have not hired non-union workers in the past. If the manager simply tells the union representative, “I have never hired non-union workers in the past” the manager is paltering. The manager is making a statement that is technically true, but misleading.

Negotiators who engage in paltering perceive their own behavior as more ethical than if they had lied by commission (after all, they did not say anything untrue). However, targets of paltering hold deceivers just responsible as do targets of lies by commission (Rogers et al., 2017).

Dodging involves a topic switch (e.g., when asked, “Do you plan to hire non-union workers?” the negotiator may reply, “Union labor helped to build some of the most important landmarks in this city”; Rogers & Norton, 2011). By dodging the actual question, respondents may shift the direction of the conversation. Related work has identified deflection, which is similar to dodging but involves the use of a question (e.g., when asked, “Do you plan to hire non-union workers?” the negotiator may reply, “Do you have family members who were part of local unions in this city?”; Bitterly & Schweitzer, 2020). People typically feel compelled to answer direct questions, so deflection is a particularly useful tactic in redirecting a conversation. Similar to lies of omission, people generally hold deceivers less responsible (and targets of deception more responsible) when they mislead people by dodging or paltering (Ren et al., 2022).

Emotional deception

Emotional deception is common in negotiations and occurs when people intentionally express an emotional state that is different from how they actually feel (Barry, 1999; Barry & Rehel, 2014; Fulmer et al., 2009; Gaspar et al., 2021; Campagna et al., 2016; Cote et al., 2013; Kang & Schweitzer, 2022; Andrade & Ho, 2009). This is very different from how people misrepresent their emotions outside of a negotiation context. In general, people seek to up-display feelings of happiness and

down-display feelings of anger; in negotiations, however, the opposite is true (Kang & Schweitzer, 2022). For example, after receiving a generous offer, many negotiators may seek to display less happiness than they truly feel. Similarly, after receiving a mediocre offer, negotiators may display more anger than they actually feel. Interestingly, people consider emotional up-displays, or the exaggerated expression of a felt emotion, less ethical and less honest than emotional down-displays, or the diminished expression of a felt emotion (Kang & Schweitzer, 2022).

Impact of deception

In general, detecting deception is difficult (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). As a result, deception can profoundly influence the negotiation process and negotiated outcomes (Gaspar et al., 2019; Barry & Rehel, 2014; Gaspar & Schweitzer, 2013). Deception exerts a great deal of influence when it goes undetected, as people in such situations rely on inaccurate information. In addition, deception exerts a great deal of influence when the other party detects it, because it harms trust, elicits retaliatory behavior (Bowles et al., 2000; Brandts & Charness, 2003; Croson et al., 2003; Schweitzer & Croson, 1999; Wang et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2011), and is more likely to rupture relationships (Rogers et al., 2017; Campagna et al., 2016; Kang et al., 2020; Bowles et al., 2000; Schweitzer et al., 2006; Boles et al., 2000; Cote et al., 2013; Naquin & Paulson, 2003; Wang et al., 2009). The magnitude of the relational harm is typically linked to the severity of the deception, though even mild forms of deception can harm relationships (Bitterly & Schweitzer, 2020; Rogers et al., 2017).

When targets detect deception, the perceived intent of the deception matters (Gaspar et al., 2019). In some cases, deception can strengthen relationships, such as when targets perceive the deception to be prosocial, or kind to the target (e.g., “Thank you for this perfect gift”; Levine & Schweitzer, 2015). However, self-serving deception—or deception that benefits the deceiver and exploits the counterpart (Erat & Gneezy, 2012; Gneezy, 2005)—is more common in negotiations, and it is this form of deception that consistently harms relational outcomes.

When deception goes undetected, the deceiver may be able to extract concessions from their counterpart (Schweitzer et al., 2005; Rogers et al., 2017; Boles et al., 2000; Croson et al., 2004; Schweitzer et al., 2006; see Gaspar et al., 2022; Gaspar et al., 2019). This reinforces many negotiators’ deceptive behaviors, making them more likely to leverage similar tactics in a future negotiation round (Ruedy et al., 2013; Vincent et al., 2013; Lewicki, 2012; see Gaspar et al., 2019).

Antecedents of deception

Reflecting the prevalence and importance of deception in negotiations, several studies have identified important antecedents of deception. One factor that makes negotiators more likely to engage in deception is feeling as though they were treated unfairly in the past (Schweitzer & Gibson, 2008). A second factor is the perception that a negotiation counterpart is a competitor rather than a collaborator (Schweitzer et al., 2005). Of course, negotiating parties both cooperate and compete with their counterparts (Galinsky & Schweitzer, 2015)—but some features of the negotiation process can make collaboration or competition more salient. For example, when a counterpart engages in trash talking, which can trigger feelings of rivalry, the other party is more likely to use deception (Yip et al., 2018). This finding is consistent with the notion that we are more likely to deceive a rival (Kilduff et al., 2016), and more likely to use deception when our motives are primarily selfish rather than prosocial (Steinel & De Dreu, 2004).

Emotions, both felt and expressed, also influence the use of deception. Related to the perception of competition, researchers have found that people were more likely to lie to a negotiation counterpart when they felt envy (Moran & Schweitzer, 2008). In other work, people were more likely to use deception when they felt angry (Yip & Schweitzer, 2018) or anxious (Kouchaki & Desai, 2015). Additional literature has found that we are more likely to deceive people who express high levels of happiness (Barasch et al., 2016) or gratitude (Yip et al., 2018). Other work has also revealed that people are more likely to lie when they feel high levels of confidence (Gaspar & Schweitzer, 2021) and lower levels of guilt (Cohen et al., 2012; Morse & Cohen, 2019).

Avoiding deception

To curtail the risks of being deceived, scholars recommend asking direct questions that elicit honest answers (Schweitzer & Croson, 1999; Minson et al., 2018; VanEpps & Hart, 2022). In these situations, the types of questions matter. General questions (e.g., “What can you tell me about the car?”), and those that surmise the absence of a problem (e.g., “There aren’t any problems with the car, are there?”), are less effective in eliciting the truth than those that presume a problem (e.g., “What problems have you had with the car?”; Minson et al., 2018). Negotiators should also seek information from multiple sources and ask follow-up questions. For example, fraud investigators, in addition to meeting with a suspicious claimant, may talk with other people; this, along with gathering physical evidence, can inform the questions that they ask and their assessment of whether their counterpart is lying (Warren & Schweitzer, 2018). Negotiators in the field should similarly seek out information from sources, and engage in a conversation with their counterpart, to curtail their risk of being deceived.

Emotion

How people communicate in negotiations may be just as important as the language they use. Specifically, the way people experience and express emotion can greatly impact the negotiation process and negotiated outcomes.

Experiencing emotions

The experience of emotion can substantially influence a negotiation. The most common emotion people feel in anticipation of a negotiation is anxiety (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011). Anxiety undermines confidence, and in negotiations, it may cause negotiators to lower their expectations, make less aggressive first offers, and attain worse outcomes (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011).

Other research has found that feeling positive affect can boost cooperation, trust, integrative behavior, and joint gains (Anderson & Thompson, 2004; Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Forgas, 1998). In contrast, feeling negative affect can lead to more aggressive first offers and greater competitiveness (Baron et al., 1990; Forgas, 1998; Knapp & Clark, 1991; Kassinove et al., 2002). Scholars have also investigated other emotions: Feeling compassion can lead to greater concern for others and promote joint gains (Allred et al., 1997), feeling guilty may encourage negotiators to be more cooperative (Ketelaar & Au, 2003), and feeling threatened can increase negotiator stress and lead to worse outcomes (Brooks, 2014; O’Connor et al., 2010).

Expressing anger

The most studied emotion in the negotiation literature is anger (Adler et al., 1998; Fisher et al., 1990; Gaspar & Schweitzer, 2013). Anger is closely associated with the negotiation process, and even if its expression is rare, it may be a particularly influential emotion in affecting negotiated outcomes (Campagna et al., 2019; Jang & Bottom, 2021; Sharma et al., 2020; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; van Kleef et al., 2004; van Kleef et al., 2010).

Anger may also offer benefits in a negotiation. By expressing frustration, negotiators can better extract concessions from their counterpart (Hershfield et al., 2012; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Sinaceur et al., 2011). Anger signals that a negotiator is dissatisfied with the negotiation process, and prior work has found that people may make greater concessions to an angry counterpart versus a neutral one (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; van Kleef et al., 2004; 2010). However, this is less likely if the counterpart has a strong BATNA (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; van Kleef et al., 2004), or if the counterpart doubts the sincerity of the anger expression (Tng & Au, 2014).

Expressing anger can also trigger negative counterpart behaviors. Specifically, after expressing anger, a counterpart may become more selfish, act more competitively, and engage in less integrative behavior (Allred et al., 1997; Butt et al., 2005). For example, when individuals are angry, they are more likely to reject unfair offers (Pillutala & Murnighan, 1996; Srivastava et al., 2009). Though many people seek to down-display their anger, the opposite may be true in a negotiation (Kang & Schweitzer, 2022), as negotiators seek to extract concessions (Adam & Brett, 2018) or mask feelings of anxiety (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011).

It is important to note that expressions of anger can cause relational harm (Campagna et al., 2016). By expressing anger, people are less likely to be trusted (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Jang & Bottom, 2022; van Kleef et al., 2015) and more likely to create a negative impression (van Kleef et al., 2004). In turn, negotiation counterparts are less willing to work with someone in the future if they express anger during a negotiation (Kopelman et al., 2006; van Kleef et al., 2004; van Beest et al., 2011).

Expressions of anger may also trigger negative emotions in others (e.g., anxiety, fear, and anger: Lelieveld et al., 2012; Friedman et al., 2004; van Kleef et al., 2004). Targets of anger expressions may feel mistreated and seek to undermine the anger expressor (Wang et al., 2012). Further, expressions of anger can harm deal implementation (Jang & Bottom, 2022) making it not only more difficult to reach an agreement, but also more challenging to implement one (Friedman et al., 2004; Kopelman et al., 2006; Yip & Schweinsberg, 2017).

In some cases, people who express anger later feel guilty about their behavior. As a result, they may make concessions that harm their goals (Campagna et al., 2019). However, this is more likely in negotiation experiments, and less likely among negotiators who intentionally up-display their expressions of anger.

Expressing other emotions

Scholars have also considered the influence of other emotions in negotiation. This work has found that expressing disappointment in a negotiation can induce guilt in the other party, leading them to behave more cooperatively (Lelieveld et al., 2012). Similarly, expressing sadness can elicit compassion and increase cooperation (Sinaceur et al., 2015).

Expressing positive emotions may also lead to more positive impressions (Forgas & Bower, 1987) and engender trust (Mislin et al., 2011). Expressing positive emotions can trigger cooperation (van Kleef

et al., 2004), making it more likely for the parties to reach a deal (Wilson et al., 2016). However, positive emotional expressions may reduce the magnitude of concessions others are willing to make (van Dijk et al., 2008; van Kleef et al., 2004). For example, expressing gratitude in a negotiation can cause a counterpart to engage in more aggressive and deceptive behavior (Yip et al., 2018).

Changing emotional expressions

Changing emotions during a negotiation may also influence negotiated outcomes (Filipowicz et al., 2011; Frijda, 1986; Kuppens et al., 2010; Scherer, 2009; Sinaceur et al., 2013). Emotional transitions can signal that the situation caused the emotional experience, rather than a person's disposition. As a result, by changing emotional expressions during a negotiation, negotiators can signal to the other party that they caused the emotional expression. Reflecting this idea, one study found that participants made greater concessions to a counterpart who first experienced happiness and only later expressed anger versus a counterpart who consistently experienced anger (Filipowicz et al., 2011).

Phase 2: Communicating: Conclusion

Though most negotiation scholarship has focused on the communicating phase, several questions remain unanswered. Namely, research should investigate the limitations of the first-offer effect when people express a desire to exit the focal negotiation in search of new alternatives. Future research should also examine the limitations of a negotiator persuading (or being persuaded by) opposing parties during a negotiation, and of the complexity around when and how to make concessions as a negotiation unfolds.

Phase 3: Closing

In the closing phase, negotiators commit to an agreement. Though we may picture signing an agreement to close a negotiation, this stage often includes ritualistic behaviors such as a handshake, a bow, or a celebratory drink. In addition, the meaning and value of a signed contract is likely to vary a great deal across cultures and contexts. For example, the nature and importance of the closing stage of a negotiation may vary a great deal depending upon whether or not we are negotiating for a good or a service. If the negotiation involves the purchase of a good (e.g., a used car), the terms of a detailed contract are likely to reflect a complete understanding of the deal. However, when negotiating for a service (e.g., hiring a new employee), the closing stage of a negotiation represents just one part of a broader relationship. Yet in many cases, such as in negotiations for services, the process involves a long-term relationship; in places where contracts are not enforceable, the negotiation closing represents just one element of a broader relationship. In most negotiation studies, the completion of a deal sheet provided by the experimenter represents the closing phase of a negotiation. Correspondingly, we know relatively little about how to close a negotiation optimally.

Terms Of The Deal

When negotiators sign a binding contract to close a negotiation, there are several issues negotiators should consider. First, negotiators should ensure that the terms of the contract reflect the terms

discussed during the negotiation. In some cases, during the closing phase of negotiations, negotiators intentionally change terms in the contract. When discovered, this can create significant conflict and rupture an agreement. Very little scholarship, however, has studied this.

Second, during the closing phase of negotiations, some negotiators “nibble” at the agreement. That is, as negotiators finalize an agreement, some negotiators insist on additional concessions. Often, negotiators employ this tactic to extract additional concessions from a counterpart when they have additional leverage (e.g., a home seller might insist on additional concessions after the home buyer has put all of their belongings in a moving van).

Third, contracts are likely to be incomplete. Even detailed contracts cannot cover every eventuality. As a result, negotiators with contracts should anticipate the possibility of renegotiating with their counterparts and value relational outcomes (e.g., maintaining trust with their counterpart in case they will need to negotiate again in the future).

Subjective Value

In addition to the deal terms, negotiators obtain a rich set of other outcomes from concluding a negotiation (Thompson, 1990). These include subjective-value outcomes, which include feelings about the instrumental outcome (e.g., outcome satisfaction, fairness), feelings about oneself (e.g., saving face, meeting one’s standards), feelings about the negotiation process (e.g., fairness, voice), and feelings about the relationship between the negotiating parties (e.g., positive impressions, desire for a future relationship) (Curhan et al., 2006).

Subjective value is important for several reasons. First, it can influence future outcomes (Curhan et al., 2006; Galinsky & Schweitzer, 2015). If negotiating parties establish a positive relationship, they can build relational capital, which makes both parties more willing to work together in the future. Additionally, negotiators who derive high subjective value from their negotiation experience typically enjoy more positive immediate outcomes from the negotiation (e.g., higher satisfaction with the negotiation process) and more positive long-term outcomes (e.g., lower turnover intention one year later; Curhan et al., 2009). Further, with positive subjective value, when negotiations involve services, negotiators are more likely to directly impact the economic value of an outcome (Hart & Schweitzer, 2022). For example, a hiring manager may benefit from hiring a new employee who is excited about their working relationship; this positive relationship may be even more important to long-term economic outcomes than the deal terms outlined in the signed contract.

Failed Negotiations And Impasses

Many negotiations end without an agreement. Reflecting the dominant paradigm that we have used to study negotiations—roleplay exercises with positive zones of agreement—many negotiation scholars have implicitly or explicitly characterized impasses as failures. In some cases, impasses really do reflect failures, including failures to learn information, identify opportunities for an agreement, and make compromises that could yield better joint gains. In these cases, learning from unsuccessful negotiations could be beneficial. For example, negotiators could learn important information about themselves and their negotiation style; alternatively, they could learn how to better discern cues from their counterpart.

However, many negotiation impasses are not actually failed negotiations (see Kesner & Shapiro, 1991; Schweinsberg et al., 2022). Negotiations may reach an impasse—wherein one or more parties ends the interaction because they could not come to an agreement (Schweinsberg et al., 2022)—for many reasons. There are three types of impasses: *Wanted impasses* are those in which both negotiators wanted the negotiation to end in an impasse, *unwanted impasses* are those in which neither party desired an impasse, and *forced impasses* are those in which only one party sought an impasse. In some cases, an impasse may be the best option for both parties. For example, both negotiating parties may be better off going with their BATNAs, or they may desire an impasse because they believe that revisiting the negotiation at a later date—when their party is better prepared for a deal—will yield better outcomes. The potential for instrumental negotiations, or those in which one party uses the negotiation process for an ulterior motive, such as to stall for time or extract information from a counterpart, is a key reason why one or more parties may end a negotiation (Kang et al., 2020).

Closing: Conclusion

This review highlights the limited attention that researchers have paid to the closing phase of negotiations and calls for scholars to investigate the intricacies surrounding the act of committing to a deal. Specifically, additional research is needed to explore the ways in which people commit to the terms of an agreement, the factors that influence the subjective value that negotiators experience during the closing phase, and the financial and interpersonal antecedents and consequences of impasses.

Phase 4: Post-Negotiation

Post-negotiation behavior is extremely important. In many domains—for example, when performing a service—the value of a negotiated agreement is created after the negotiation. In addition, behavior after a negotiation may include intentions to reengage with a counterpart in a future negotiation. As a result, the rapport negotiators develop through the negotiation process can have important downstream consequences.

Post-Agreement Behavior

In many negotiation contexts, post-negotiation behavior is a primary driver of economic value (Hart & Schweitzer, 2020; 2022). For example, after negotiating a new employee's salary, the employee will perform work and exert effort that creates economic value for their manager. Notably, this is not how most experiments have studied negotiation. For example, in the popular negotiation exercise “New Recruit,” which involves hiring a new employee, the negotiation simply ends with a deal sheet asking participants about the terms of their deal—there is no post-negotiation stage.

Hart and Schweitzer (2022) introduce the concept of ERRO (economic relevance of relational outcomes) to conceptualize the idea that relational outcomes impact economic outcomes. In “high ERRO” contexts, a counterpart's post-negotiation behavior can greatly impact a negotiator's economic value. For example, when a manager hires a new employee, the economic outcome of the negotiation is affected not only by the explicit terms of the deal (e.g., how much the manager pays the employee), but also by the employee's post-negotiation behavior (e.g., how hard the employee

works after the negotiation). In contrast, in “low ERRO” contexts, a counterpart’s post-negotiation behavior weakly affects the negotiator’s final economic outcome. For example, a buyer may purchase a vacuum or a new phone, and in these situations, the seller’s post-negotiation behavior has very little impact on the value that the buyer derives from the sale. In short, in high ERRO contexts, negotiators show greater relational concern, negotiate less competitively, establish stronger relationships with the other party, and positively motivate their counterpart’s post-negotiation behavior (ultimately resulting in economic benefits for the negotiator) (Hart & Schweitzer, 2022).

Some work also suggests that simply engaging in a negotiation—rather than abstaining from a negotiation—can affect post-negotiation behavior (Hart & Schweitzer, 2020). Negotiations are mixed-motive interactions in that parties must navigate a blend of aligned and competing goals. In some cases, by engaging in a negotiation (particularly a distributive negotiation that focuses on the exchange of prices), negotiators highlight their conflicting interests in a manner that can harm post-negotiation motivation. This is a particular concern for services, where post-negotiation behavior creates extensive value. For example, potential negotiators may avoid negotiating the wage of a new babysitter. Instead of seeking better deal terms, the best course of action may be to avoid negotiating altogether.

Negotiator Satisfaction

Negotiator satisfaction is a meaningful predictor of a negotiator’s future behavior (Curhan et al., 2009; Novemsky & Schweitzer, 2004). There are several factors that influence negotiator satisfaction. One key factor is the subjective perception of a deal’s economic value. For example, negotiators are often dissatisfied if their first offer is accepted because they may believe that they could have attained a better outcome (Galinsky et al., 2002).

Research has found that negotiator perceptions of a deal’s economic value are also influenced by the comparisons people make to evaluate their outcome (Novemsky & Schweitzer, 2004). That is, the satisfaction a negotiator may derive depends on several types of comparisons: (1) the comparison a negotiator makes between their own outcome and the outcome of their counterpart (e.g., a car buyer comparing their outcome to the seller’s profit; Gillespie et al., 2000; Loewenstein et al., 1999; Novemsky & Schweitzer, 2004), (2) the comparison a negotiator makes between their own outcome and the outcome they expected to attain (e.g., a car buyer comparing their actual outcome to their expected outcome; Oliver et al., 1994), and (3) the comparison a negotiator makes between their own outcome and the outcomes attained by those in a similar situation (e.g., a car buyer comparing their outcome to other car buyers’ outcomes; Novemsky & Schweitzer, 2004). For example, a negotiator’s aspiration and reservation prices may influence their satisfaction in that those with a low (vs. high) reservation and aspiration price, respectively, were more satisfied and felt more successful even with identical outcomes (Thompson, 1995). Additionally, negotiators who focus on their aspiration price typically attain better economic outcomes in negotiations, but they are less satisfied after the negotiation than those who focus on their BATNA (Galinsky et al., 2002). One implication is that negotiators could strategically shift their focus depending on the negotiation phase: Negotiators should focus on their aspiration price during the negotiation in order to reap the best outcome and focus on their BATNA after the negotiation in order to gain the most satisfaction (Galinsky et al., 2002). In practice, however, this may be difficult.

Counterpart Satisfaction

Managing the satisfaction of one's counterpart is particularly important (Carnevale et al., 1982; Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Curhan et al., 2006; Curhan et al., 2009). A satisfied counterpart can increase commitment to an agreement and help negotiators build a favorable reputation. This can be done by managing the other party's perceptions of the deal—by helping to convince the counterpart that they attained a favorable agreement, that they are respected, and that the outcome was equitable. Making sure that one's counterpart is satisfied is also important because it will affect the party's post-negotiation behavior, which can subsequently impact their future intentions and the negotiator's own economic value (Hart & Schweitzer, 2020; 2022).

Reputations

Though most negotiation scholarship to date has focused on single-shot negotiations, a negotiator's long-term reputation can influence the decision to enter a negotiation and ultimately drive the counterpart's behavior. Many negotiations involve ongoing interactions (e.g., union-management negotiations or employee-boss negotiations) that enable potential negotiators to learn from others' experiences.

A few studies have explored reputations in negotiation (see Tinsley et al., 2002). This work has studied the development of both negative (or difficult) and positive (or trustworthy) reputations. For example, after engaging in aggressive or competitive behavior, and after making an extreme offer, negotiators can gain a reputation that causes future negotiators to adopt a more confrontational approach, ultimately making future negotiations more difficult (Bhatia & Gunia, 2018; Campagna et al., 2016; Schweinsberg et al., 2012; see Huffmeier et al., 2014). Indeed, establishing a reputation as a competitive negotiator may cause negotiation counterparts to set higher aspirations and behave more contentiously (Galinsky et al., 2002; Tinsley et al., 2002).

Conversely, a history of building relationships and trust can benefit a negotiator's reputation and improve their long-term economic outcomes (Curhan et al., 2009; Glick & Croson, 2001; Kong et al., 2014). When interacting with a negotiator who has a positive reputation, the other party is more likely to share information (Tinsley et al., 2006).

Repeated Negotiations

Repeated negotiations are yet another under-investigated topic in negotiation scholarship. Often, rather than meeting for the first time, negotiation counterparts may convene to renegotiate an existing agreement. For example, airlines and pilots, as well as employees and managers, routinely renegotiate their contracts. Often, this occurs after a fixed period of time, or after discrete events (e.g., after an employee has received an outside offer).

Relational concerns and trust are critical where repeated negotiations are concerned (Ferrin et al., 2008; Hart & Schweitzer, 2020; 2022; Lount et al., 2008). Negotiators can use the rapport and goodwill that they have accrued in a prior negotiation to help them in future negotiations. Additionally, if negotiators anticipate future negotiations with the same party, they might strategically make concessions to reap better outcomes later. Some work also suggests that the type of impasse that a prior negotiation ended on can affect behavior in a future negotiation (Schweinsberg et al., 2022).

Stage 4: Post-Negotiation: Conclusion

Post-negotiation feelings and behavior can play an important role in the subjective and economic outcomes people attain from a negotiation. Future research should investigate questions such as: What post-negotiation behaviors are most impactful, how can negotiators optimize post-negotiation behavior, how might negotiators maintain both their own and their counterparts' satisfaction during and after the negotiation, and what factors moderate subjective and economic outcomes of repeated negotiations?

Phases Of Negotiation: Conclusion

In this review, negotiations are conceptualized as having four distinct phases: setting the stage, communicating, closing, and post-negotiation. Most negotiation scholarship has focused on the communicating phase, and much of this work has examined the influence of first offers. This focus reflects, in part, the dominant paradigm we have used to study negotiations—namely, lab-based studies in which people are assigned roles, read background information, and asked to enact a negotiation. Future work should use additional methods to explore other stages of the negotiation process in greater depth.

THE LIMITS OF WHAT WE KNOW

Negotiation is important and complex in equal measure. This review concludes with a brief history of negotiation scholarship, additional thoughts on the limits of what we know, and a call for future negotiation research.

Though humans have been negotiating for millennia, the academic study of negotiation is remarkably recent. Scholars have studied adjacent fields, such as conflict (a broader topic that encompasses goal conflict, emotional conflict, and war; Himes, 2008), but only (relatively) recently did Nash (1953) formalized the idea of mixed motive negotiations that involve both cooperation and competition. In 1982, Howard Raiffa published *The Art and Science of Negotiation*, a book that transformed the study of negotiation. As Keeney (2016, p. 215) explains, Raiffa “founded the discipline of negotiation analysis. Prior to that time, much of the knowledge about negotiations was basically art and folklore, with essentially no systematic structure or science.” In psychology, early negotiation research built on Raiffa’s (1982) framework and focused on cognitive biases (e.g., anchoring, overconfidence; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Larrick & Wu, 2007). Subsequent work extended the study of negotiation to include a broader set of dynamics, including the influence of affect and emotion (e.g., anger, anxiety; van Kleef et al., 2004; Brooks & Schweitzer 2011) and key features of negotiation conversations (e.g., asking questions, speaking turns; Kwon & Weingart, 2004; Minson et al., 2018).

Negotiation scholarship, however, has developed across several disciplines, including communications (Putnam & Roloff, 1992), economics (Roth, 1985), legal scholarship (Wilkinson-Ryan & Small, 2008), and crisis negotiations (Vecchi et al., 2005). Each discipline has approached negotiations with a unique lens, but across these disciplines, scholars have wrestled with a common challenge: Negotiations are hard to study. It is difficult for scholars to insert themselves as observers in the midst of important business or political bargaining. It is similarly difficult to get complete transcripts and interviews of participants in these negotiations. As a result, negotiation scholars

have worked to draw inferences from a single or small number of actual negotiations (Sebenius, 1984), analyzed partial information gleaned from many negotiations (Schweinsberg et al., 2023), or relied on experimental simulations (Brown & Baer, 2011) to further our understanding of this topic. To this end, in social psychology, roleplay exercises represent the dominant paradigm scholars have used to study negotiations. Initially, social psychologists analyzed the roleplay exercises that they had conducted with their students; later, with increasing sophistication, they conducted negotiation simulations with lab-based and online participant samples. Results from these studies have helped to build knowledge and understanding of negotiations, but many questions involving this approach to studying remain unanswered. For example, by inviting participants to engage in a negotiation, we have learned very little about when or why people avoid or choose to negotiate. Table 2 identifies several underexplored facets of negotiation, and future work should expand our understanding of several streams of negotiation scholarship.

Table 2: Call for Negotiation Research

Research Topic	Illustrative Questions to be Answered
Expertise	How does expertise influence negotiator behavior? How do expertise asymmetries influence negotiations?
Relationships	How do people negotiate differently with different relationship partners (e.g., colleagues, supervisors, friends, spouses)? When do negotiations help or harm relationships, and how can harm be reduced?
Preparation	How do negotiators prepare for a negotiation? How should they prepare? What role can technology play?
Initiating and Persisting	When should potential negotiators decide to negotiate, avoid a negotiation, or persist in a negotiation, or exit a negotiation?
Multiparty Negotiations	How does using mediators affect the relationship between counterparts? How does using agents affect people's deal outcomes, including satisfaction? What moderates these effects?
Teams	How should a negotiation team be structured and run? What team leadership style is most effective for distributive, compatible, and integrative negotiations?
Communication	How does the disclosure of one's own interests affect the other party's willingness to share information about their interests? When are open-ended questions (i.e., beginning with "how," "what," "why") more effective than binary questions (i.e., those eliciting a "yes" or "no" response)?
Concessions	How does each party perceive concessions made by the other person? Is it always clear that a concession has been made? When are concessions most effective at moving a deal forward? What factors enable people to save face and maintain power while making concessions?
Closing	How should negotiators conclude a negotiation to gain commitment to a deal? How does the conclusion of one negotiation influence the start of the next negotiation?

Note. Though some scholarship has studied these topics, they are under-investigated.

There are many important areas of negotiation research that merit additional attention. Several under-investigated topics are listed in Table 2. In addition to these topics, we call for future scholars to advance our understanding of cross-cultural negotiations (Gelfand et al., 2012). This work should study the intersection of individual characteristics in addition to culture (e.g., gender, ethnicity, culture, sexual orientation; Shan et al., 2019). Future work is also needed to expand our understanding of contextual factors, such as how the negotiation setting may influence the negotiation itself (Brown & Baer, 2011), or how alcohol may impact the negotiation process (Schweitzer & Kerr, 2000; Schweitzer & Gomberg, 2001).

Further, future work should expand our understanding of emotion, trust, and deception in negotiations. It should also expand our understanding of the exchange-of-information process and how the exchange of offers affects relational outcomes. For example, whereas most emotion research in negotiations has focused on anger (Adler et al., 1998), there are substantial opportunities to build on a growing literature that has studied other emotions (see Lelieveld et al., 2012; Sinaceur et al., 2015; Yip et al., 2018). Many open questions remain, especially with respect to the most common negotiator emotions—excitement and anxiety (see Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011). Another fruitful avenue for research involves deepening our understanding of the most effective strategies for building trust (Mislin et al., 2011; Mislin et al., 2015), and the ways in which trust is broken (Schweitzer et al., 2005; van Kleef et al., 2010) and restored (Schweitzer et al., 2006) during a negotiation.

Similarly, future work should expand our understanding of unethical behavior in negotiations. Prior work has studied unethical behavior almost exclusively with respect to deception, but many other types of unethical negotiator behavior exist as well—for example, engaging in insincere negotiations or negotiating in bad faith (Kang et al., 2020).

Negotiations In The Wild

Many of the gaps in our understanding reflect the paradigms we have used to study negotiation. Due to scholars' dependence on laboratory-based experiments, we know surprisingly little about some of the most important features that influence negotiations. For example, though many of our most important negotiations involve people with substantial negotiation experience—and those with asymmetries in experience, such as negotiations to purchase a house (e.g., realtors vs. first-time home buyers), to purchase a car (e.g., car salespeople vs. buyers), to negotiate a salary (e.g., HR managers vs. new employees), or to negotiate a merger between companies (e.g., business executives vs. their lawyers)—we know surprisingly little about negotiator expertise. Similarly, we know very little about what happens after a negotiation concludes; our knowledge of how repeated negotiations unfold is equally limited, and we know little about team and multiparty negotiations. Future negotiation scholarship should address these critical gaps in our knowledge.

We also know little about naturalistic features of negotiation. This leads to key questions involving topics such as how negotiations unfold over prolonged periods of time. In addition, how do prior negotiations and existing relationships influence the negotiation process? What happens when some members of a negotiation team have worked together, but others have not?

Some of the most important forces that influence negotiation occur away from the negotiation itself. For example, we know little about how to prepare for a negotiation, how to improve a BATNA, what pre-meetings to schedule before a multiparty negotiation, or how negotiations influence post-negotiation behavior. Consequently, negotiation scholarship should extend investigations to field settings in order to fill such gaps in our understanding.

Technological Advancement And Building Bridges In Negotiation Scholarship

Technology has transformed the way negotiations are conducted, and this is reflected in research. Whereas most early work focused on face-to-face negotiations, more recent scholarship has examined email, text, and video negotiations. Several studies have investigated how negotiating face-to-face compares to negotiating via email, text, or video conference (Geiger, 2020; Schweitzer et

al., 2002). In general, face-to-face negotiations yield more efficient outcomes (Geiger, 2020). Specifically, face-to-face negotiations may require less time to finalize an agreement than text-based mediums (Galini et al., 2007), and compared to email, face-to-face negotiations engender greater trust (Lu et al., 2017; Naquin & Paulson, 2003). Text-based negotiations, however, have important benefits in affording asynchronous and economical communication. In addition, text-based negotiations may enable negotiators to develop higher construals and ultimately attain more efficient outcomes (Friedman & Belkin, 2013).

Overall, scholarship has identified relatively few differences in negotiation across mediums (see Geiger, 2020). The differences scholars have identified appear to relate to moderators, such as the negotiating party's cooperative orientation (Swaab et al., 2012), culture (Rosette et al., 2012), and whether the negotiating parties have a personal relationship (Moore et al., 1999). Comfort with the medium (Geiger & Parlamis, 2014) and intent to use deception (Schweitzer et al., 2002) are additional differences to consider across mediums.

One challenge—and opportunity—in studying the interplay between negotiation and technology is the continued evolution of technology-associated norms. For example, Schweitzer et al. (2002) studied video negotiations circa 2000. At the time, video negotiations were novel and required specialized equipment in a dedicated room. Norms regarding video negotiations shifted dramatically in the ensuing decades, but scholars have not sufficiently revisited the interplay between technology and negotiations.

Another direction for future work is the investigation of the mixed use of communication media. For example, negotiators may meet in person at one point in time, and then continue to negotiate via video at a second point in time. Meeting in person may help negotiators build and maintain trust, and future work can explore the optimal mix for meeting in person and via video over time.

Emerging technologies have created a growing number of opportunities for negotiators. For example, negotiators may use training software to prepare for a negotiation or get feedback on their negotiation skills (Johnson et al., 2017; Johnson et al., 2019; see Dinnar et al., 2021). Other technology enables negotiators to change their appearance or speaking style (Baten & Hoque, 2021). Technological innovations have also vastly improved negotiators' ability to communicate with people in different languages, in real time, across far distances. And of course, developments in artificial intelligence are creating new avenues for training in negotiation, such as using bots to prepare and debrief negotiations, providing personalized feedback, and even providing mediation services.

In addition to helping negotiators prepare and make decisions within their negotiations, new technologies also create opportunities for negotiation scholars. For example, scholars can research negotiations with chatbots built with artificial intelligence and use natural language processing and machine learning to analyze conversational data at scale. In contrast to early work that analyzed negotiation texts with human coding (see Weingart et al., 2004; Schweitzer & Gomberg, 2001), more recent technological advancements enable us to analyze massive amounts of text quickly (Kosinski, 2024). This line of inquiry connects with a growing literature (Brooks et al., 2019; Reece et al., 2023; Yeomans et al., 2022) that highlights our need to better understand how features of conversations influence the negotiation process and negotiated outcomes (Hart et al., 2021; Minson et al., 2018). Similarly, advancements in emotion coding and physiological measures offer new paths to deepen our understanding of emotion and deception in a negotiation context.

CONCLUSION

Over the past 50 years, the study of negotiations has evolved from examining simple, abstract choices to harnessing sophisticated experimental designs and large-scale data analysis (Boothby et al., 2023; Raiffa, 1982; Schweinsberg et al., 2023). This scholarly progression has established core negotiation principles, identified crucial contextual factors and moderators, and informed practical strategies that comprise the backbone of countless courses, resources, and popular publications. However, despite the significant body of negotiation scholarship, our understanding of this complex, consequential, and ubiquitous phenomenon is still developing. The intricacies of human interactions, combined with ever-evolving social norms and advancements in technology and research methods, ensure that negotiation scholars will continue to uncover insights that will shape our personal and professional lives for decades to come.

AUTHOR NOTE

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ENDNOTES

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